Familiar Things

I did not think I would write about Stranger Things. I had watched the first season, kind of enjoyed it, and did not think further about it until I started readings in the New York Times how popular it had been and how excited many people were about the upcoming finale.

So I watched the whole thing again from the first to the last season. Again, I kind of enjoyed thing and, of course, started doing anthropology when things got slow.

I will assume that Wikipedia (like ChatGPT) is a good enough source to get a mostly non-controversial consensus about something like a popular culture product. Wikipedia says that “The show combines elements of horror, science fiction, mystery, coming-of-age, and drama.” It also gives statistical evidence about its success with various audiences. I imagine most of those who watched it “kind of enjoyed it” even when the initial wonder about the premise and conceit became obvious. I knew from the beginning that the monster would be vanquished, but found interesting the way the writers took us there.

I am not going to write about the obvious: horror, fantasy, science fiction. I am generally a sucker for the latter but there is not much of this after the first season. I generally pass the other two genres.

What I focus on, today, is on the way Wikipedia develops the “coming-of-age” trope by noting that the writers tell us that the action happens “in a town where nothing ever happens.” This town, “Hawkins,” is located “in Indiana. Locating it in Maine, Wyoming, Alabama, California, locations would probably have required other site-setting cliches. In any event, Hawkins appears mostly as homes, a research lab, and above all, the School. The School (middle and high) brings together the heroes and sets one of the central tensions of the show: the relationship between friends playing Dungeon & Dragons who are identified as “freaks” and bullied by a caricatural posse of “jocks.” The friends will save the world threatened by adults who are either evil (researchers, the military, the State) or just clueless (parents, teachers, administrators). And the friends are led by an ultimate outsider, a person without a name (“El”), who leaves after the victory against the human and non-humans demons. She leaves, alone and to the sorrow of all, because her staying would trigger again what she started, unwittingly.

funeral, town and mountains
The friends, the town, and the range

I am, of course, accentuating certain aspects of this epic, to stress its familiarity, and to wonder about the stability of the tropes and conceits. In that vein, Stranger Things could be taken as remake of Shane, and many other products of the American imagination as proposed by corporations (Hollywood, Netflix) and widely enjoyed. For those who do not know the novel/movie Shane it is a story about a group of new friends settling themselves in conflict with an evil entity who wants to evict, or kill, them all. They fight back led by a man with just one name (“Shane”), no past he will mention, and who leaves at the end, after the victory, because his staying (after killing the evil ones) would threaten the future peace of the friends

Let’s return to the “coming of age” trope. It is, of course, a very common one that is developed in many ways. It may appear as tragedy (as in Dreiser’s American tragedy), or drama as in Pretty in pink. It might be treated on a comic mode as in movies like Ferris Buehler’s day off. Or it may be treated more ponderously as in movies like American Graffiti or The last picture show. The list is long! I might even include Divergent (high school student fighting cliques to transform the world), or even Barbie and, why not Legally Blonde or even the much older movie Pillow talk which plays off one of the not so minor theme in Stranger Things: the off (at the start) and on (sometimes), and off again, romances.

The high point in the coming of age saga is, of course, high school graduation and, not so rarely, the valedictorian speech that summarizes it. The one in Stringer Things is wonderfully … familiar

Principal Higgins:
And then, it is my please to introduce someone who truly excelled during their time here
Henderson:
[Over the past years] there was a lot of bad … and a lot of good but but chaos can bring innovation, change, and this school, frankly it needed to change because we were so divided into the jocks, the nerds, freaks and in the chaos all these wall broke down and I made new friends. I made friends who were never even supposed to be my friends. And this was not just me. I saw this happen with so many others. And when you get to know people who are so different from you, you begin to learn more about yourself, you change, you grow. I am a better person now because of them, because of my friends. So I am not pissed off anymore but I am worried that, because now the chaos is over, Principal Higgins and every square like him is gonna do their damnedest to put everything back in order and I don’t want order

I have highlighted all the indexes (as I would now write about them) that led me to title my dissertation “Individualism, community, and love”:

  • “I am a better person [who] learned about myself” (individualism)
  • We are “friends who were never supposed to be my friends” (community)
  • “walls that broke down … and we made new friends that were not supposed to be our friends” (love).

In the dissertation, and the book that followed, a book I would now title “Together in America” rather than “Americans Together” (1978), I failed to face the critique of the State that is also inscribed in the speech (and in the script of Divergent, Barbie, or, prototypically, Shane)

The anthropological mystery in all this concerns the stability of what Lévi-Strauss might have called a “structure” (or what Propp called a “form,” or what AI uses to generate products that look more than right). One might focus on what may have changed over the years: the most visible might be the interracial romance, the gay and lesbian characters or the principal’s use of “their” to introduce the male hero.

These differences may actually help us understand the stability not in terms of “enculturation,” or “habitus,” but rather in term of the kind of corrective instruction that concerned Garfinkel when he wrote what I now consider should be the foundation of all theories of order: “when you screw around, then you get instructed.” So, I would interpret Netflix’s casting and scripting as responding to a fear of corrective instruction by voices inside and outside the corporation telling them: “why no black characters?! “why no gender diversity?!” voices that the producers of Shane would not have to worry about (though they probably had to worry about the overt critique of State and Economy that made them project into a mythical valley the struggle trade unions were conducting against the dominant corporations, mention of which might have led to be branded “communists”—a very dangerous things at the time).

 

 

ChatGPT as educator?

In my earlier post, I attempted to “assess” CG the way I might assess a student. This assessment led me to the uncomfortable conclusion, that, in this case, it was indeed a very good, albeit uninteresting, student. It was the kind who tells me exactly what I just taught them and then loop this back to myself. It was a perfect artificial student and I do not need any of those.

I closed the post with a question to open a different line of investigation. Shoud I treat ChatGPT (CG from now on, as type of a social fact often glossed as “AI”) as an “educator”? Or, at least, in Cremin’s phrase, an “educational institution.” The answer has to be “Perhaps…. but…”

What kind of educator might CG be? To answer this, an anthropologist wonders about what it is actually used for. By every account it is used for a lot of stuff, including some stuff many people think it should not be used to, or should be prevented from doing. I have used it most successfully for technical questions about programming details. I know advanced programmers use it extensively for this. I have collected stories from acquaintances about their use of CG. I watched generated videos on YouTube. I know of a young close relative of mine, who used it explore, while confined at home during “Covid,” marxism-leninism and the history of Russia, as well as neo-naziism around the world—with no guidance or control from any other person. Many use it to check their written English. And everyone, from government officials, to journalists, to everyone with whom I talked can be produce extended discourses about the good or bad of CG. It is undoubtedly a “total social fact” no one can escape.

The part of me who teaches Rancière to make students aware of all aspects of education that escapes the State can only celebrate all this. CG might be the ultimate “ignorant school master”—except that it is one that knows everything! So, CG is more like an infinite library open day and night, 24/7 to anyone interested to browse through it. It is a library with an altogether kind librarian that keeps close track of what one has explored and responds to further investigations with an encouraging “this a good question, let me think” before summarizing what one might have read and, perhaps, send one into a further investigation deepening the initial one.

But CG is not at all like the, Jacotot, the schoolmaster who inspired Rancière. This schoolmaster may be ignorant of the topic interesting to a student but he is actively involved in prodding their will to continue searching and reaching a new mastery. By contrast, so far at least, CG is silent until one asks. This silence is actually, for me, just what I want from a library, and an assistant librarian. I use CG regularly because it is indeed a a powerful tool for an intellectual, a major advance over Google.

But this silence or relative passivity also suggests that CG is not an “educator” in any of the usual senses. It is not a teacher. It is not a master. It is not a mentor. It does not have a curriculum. It does not mete consequences.

To push this, I asked ChatGPT “what should I know about the creationism museum”? Having visited it, I can say that answer was clear, succinct, as well as expanding on the controversies surrounding it. And CG ended as usual, with suggestions for further explorations: “If you want, I can also summarize how this museum is seen by scientific organizations or provide tips for visiting (hours, ticketing, best time to go).” There were links to further sources.for the theoretically inclined this is an instance of the “instruction writer” limits sketched by Garfinkel (2002: Chapter 6).
But there was no clear indication that using the answers “naively,” as one might use other answers, might land one in very dangerous interactional or political settings. CG, so far, does not (cannot?) know the social contexts within which its answers might be used.

“We” (teachers, professors, educators…) must, at least, warn our students…

assessing ChatGPT as student

I have started organizing my blog posts in view of a possible publication. This is involving re-reading and re-indexing. In this process I found a series of posts published in 2011 “on assessment” following a small conference at Teachers College that a preparatory gathering that was part of the large “Commission on the Future of Assessment” led by Ed Gordon. I do not have the full list of participants but they included Ray McDermott, Robbie McClintock, Aaron Hung, Gus Andrews. At the time, I wrote 5 posts and one article (Varenne 2013) that developed our perennial themes reflected in this blog: a continuing exploration of the tension between State and the individual in their local assemblies. In brief, one the one hand, in the world of schooling, the State determines what is the “right” answer to a question to which the teacher knows the answer where “right” means that the teacher authorizes the student to move on to the next step. In brief, local assemblies look for, and find, ways to bypass the State as they inscribe an alternate “next” as a plausible, if not always consequential, new “right-for-current-purposes.”

In the last post of the 2011 series, I played at imagining something that, then, appeared to be a flight of “science fiction.” I imagined a world where “Google” (standing of any kind of search “engine”) would keep in its memory our searches and would base next searches on the basis of these earlier ones thereby helping one find faster some obscure matter one was searching for. This “imagined” technology would analyze our interests and, perhaps, even tell us not to search further into disallowed topics as a kind of mentor.

Fourteen years later, much of this is not science fiction anymore. It is our everyday life. I would date the social facting of this brave new world with the explosion of ChatGPT in the Fall 2024—when students mentioned it, I explored it, and was told by my grandson that he had already used it to flesh out a story of his. What may still be missing in this world is a mentor.

Given ChatGPT’s claim to authoritative, “intelligent,” knowledge, it is fair to assess it as a professor would any student claiming the status. So, as stereotypical teacher in a stereotypical lesson, asking students question to which I know the answer and checking how close is the answer to being “right,” I asked ChatGPT: what is emile durkheim best known for? ChatGPT answered (excerpt, full answer):

Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) is best known as one of the founders of modern sociology and for establishing sociology as an academic discipline distinct from philosophy and psychology. His major contributions include:
1. Theory of Social Facts …
2. Division of Labor and Solidarity …
3. Study of Suicide …
4. Religion and Collective Consciousness …
5. Education and Morality…
In short: Durkheim is best known for demonstrating that society shapes individual behavior, for introducing systematic methods to study social phenomena, and for foundational works on social facts, solidarity, suicide, and religion.

This answer passes as “right” (B+ if given by a doctoral student in anthropology) though not particularly imaginative, or indicative that everyone of these statements was controversial. So, to probe whether my exam question was too vague, and knowing the answer, I asked: Which aspects of Durkhem did Talcott Parsons emphasize? ChatGPT answered (excerpt, full answer):

Talcott Parsons emphasized Émile Durkheim primarily as a theorist of normative order, social integration, and moral regulation, selectively reading Durkheim in ways that supported Parsons’s own project of structural functionalism. Here are the main aspects Parsons highlighted:
1. Social Order and Norms …
2. Action Governed by Values (Not Just Interests) …
3. Social Facts as Moral Constraints …
4. Integration as the Core Social Problem …
5. Religion as a Moral System …
Parsons tended to soften or neglect:
Durkheim’s attention to conflict and coercion
The emotional, ritual, and ecstatic dimensions of religion
Durkheim’s methodological radicalism (“treat social facts as things”)
In One Sentence:
Parsons emphasized Durkheim as a theorist of normative integration and moral order, transforming him into a cornerstone of consensus-oriented functionalism, while muting Durkheim’s sharper edges around power, conflict, and crisis.

This answer also passes as “right” (A- if given by a doctoral student in anthropology), though, again somewhat lacking in caveats. The answer may be deemed overly “declarative” by some assessors. So, to probe further into weeds most social scientists would not consider useful, I then asked a question I did not expect ChatGPT to answer as expertly (for the full answer go to): What are the main aspects of Garfinkel’s critique of Parsons’ take on Durkheim? ChatGPT answered, in 612 words of which I only quote the last (excerpt, full answer):

III. The fundamental divergence (in one contrast)
Parsons Garfinkel
Norms explain action Action produces norms
Values are internalized Accountability is displayed
Order is systemic Order is local and practical
Actor is norm-following Actor is methodically competent
Durkheim = moral consensus Durkheim = practical moral workBottom line: Garfinkel’s critique is not that Parsons misunderstood Durkheim entirely, but that he domesticated him. Garfinkel’s Durkheim: is not a theorist of value systems, but a theorist of how moral order is accomplished in practice.

This answer if fully right in my world and I would rate it a doctoral student “A.”

Except that I suddenly had a doubt: did ChatGPT know that I am the one who was asking the question? This came to me as I noticed that it exactly summarizes what I teach, publish, and blog. Much of this is open to everyone… These concluding sentences are what makes me wonder:

This reinterpretation profoundly reshaped sociology, influencing conversation analysis, studies of work, education (including McDermott & Varenne), and the micro-foundations of social order.
If you’d like, I can:
trace this argument directly through Studies in Ethnomethodology
connect this to McDermott’s classroom analyses as Durkheimian ethnomethodology

I felt spooked: CG has read our work and is quoting it back to us! However, and I did not dig further, it is, also, an interpretation: After all, for many years of his careers, and possibly onto now, McDermott would not have claimed Durkheim (about whom he may have learned through secondary discussion of Parsons’s take–the most common in the 1960s and 70s when we were doctoral students at Stanford and Chicago)—or might have considered him irrelevant.

In any event, the sequence of answer makes ChatGPT appear almost “intelligent” and altogther compliant. I do not have to worry that it will discuss with itself (as I know students do among themselves) about Varenne’s odd interests.

That leaves us with at least two set of further questions. Among the faculty at TC, as it appears is the case in all schools around the world, there is much emphasis on one type of “danger”: that our students, when asked an exam question will put this question to ChatGPT who will give an unimpeachable answer the students can then pass as their own. ChatGPT can now be used as glorified Cliff Notes!

However this danger is only a threat to our claim that only we, university professors, can properly assess student knowledge for any purpose of the State, leading to degrees with “rights and privileges thereunto attached” (as the diplomas, will, candidly, state). Much on this will be written (along with bemoaning “grade inflation) so I will focus again on my 2011 thought experiment:

What if ChatGPT gets used as a tool for education away from State control?

References

Varenne, Hervé, G. Andrews, A. Hung, and S. Wessler   2013     “Polities and politics of ongoing assessments: Evidence from video-gaming and blogging.” in Discourse 2.0. Edited by D. Tannen and A. Trester, Georgetown University Round Table on Language and Linguistics series. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press. pp. 27-46.

Family/Community as network of significance

After the eclipse of “community” in the late 1960s anthropology, culminating with Geertz’ quip that “anthropologists do not villages study in villages, “community” came back when Lave, and particularly Wenger’s, summarized their work on learning in everyday settings as involving “‘community’ of practices.”

I have written elsewhere why I thought it was a bad idea for Lave and Wenger to have used the term. Generations of anthropologists (and many others) have been misled by this resuscitation of a way to approaching human organization that should have remained in the past. At various times, I suggested that “polity” would be a better word to capture the overall social processes involved in setting the positions (peripheral, full, etc.) and movement. The model can easily be expanded to deal with all the mechanisms that move someone into a “legitimate” peripheral position (e.g. admission committee), prevent someone from ever being acknowledged as “full” (e.g. failure at some examination), and including other matters that remain open to investigation: for example the processes that make someone aware that one might enter into some apprenticeship (move to a different country, etc.). I sometimes toy with the idea of a kind of “accretion” disk around the internal polity that might then be treated, metaphorically, as a “black hole” (e.g. “America” for many in the world).

Having been challenged by students insisting on the continuing usefulness of “community” (and perhaps for other reasons than those who let the early Chicago sociologists and anthropologists to write about “community studies”), I realized something that came even more salient because of a recent experience with a major personal loss and that classical “community of practice” research cannot quite handle. When she first wrote about it, Lave was responding (as I put it in my last post) to cognitive psychologists and their purely cerebral theories of learning. She wanted to establish that learning is always a social process that requires the one is put in the position of “learner” even before they know anything. She, and many others, did establish, empirically, that this is the case.

However, she may have downplayed another possibility somewhat implicit in the earlier theories of community. “Community” is not only about learning, it is about support and, what I would now want to investigate, the assembly of people who are doing the support. Or rather, and much more technically, about the people “affected” by something that happens to a particular person. They are the people who may then return something—in the sense that a personal tragedy is also a “gift” that requires a response by at least some. This response may involve, in the case of someone dying, bringing food, attending a wake, making a donation (in some traditions in the United States), or may other matters in other traditions (“culture”).

This opens a wide range of re-interpreted research questions. Most simply perhaps, who would be the “some” who must respond? And what should be the nature of the response? How far can an initial event resonate? As one student asked when I presented an earlier version of this: what is the place of institutions in these responses?

Possible lines of investigation: I have never read the social psychological literature that has used the phrase “significant others” but it has always allowed me to think more specifically about human relationships. First, I take “signification” here in the structural sense (see Bateson 1972: 381) where it refers to anything that makes a difference. In very brief then, a person’s significant others are those who, if something happens to the person, must respond personally in some ways that might make a difference in the future of the interaction. One should check here how this may be treated in the literature on family therapy.

A parent, a spouse, a child, are prime examples to the extent that anything that happens to anyone of them will impact on of them but not necessarily in the same way The response, and its extent within some assembly, are then a sign of who are these “others” and the weight of their significance.

That all of this is going to be observable (though perhaps difficult to do) is not problematic. What are the methods to use for the observations is the difficult thing since we need to escape imagining what is to be observed (I am here invoking Garfinkel). The danger is to define ahead of the research the boundaries of some units assumed to carry significance, of the roles and relationships that may be most significant. Much on the writing about “the family” (and the “community”) have fallen for this and must now be used with the greatest care unless we reproduce what earlier critics did successfully challenge.

The genius of ethnography is specifically that we do not have to do that. So, what do I suggest be done?

In this case I’d start with an individual at a moment of stress. For ethical reason, this stress may be minor (e.g. a tooth ache, college admission or graduation, etc.) but sufficient to trigger some response from some people. Tracing the network of the responders, and the intensity of their response becomes the ethnographic goal.

See also my post on the “end of a community”
For example, let’s say that husband has a tooth ache and mentions it to wife and they discuss what to do next. One can imagine that this will not lead to much of a response from, say, their small children. Whether it affects their adult children may depend on the their age and other matters. If the husband/wife are quite aged, a toothache might require one of the children to, for example, drive them to the dentist. At another extreme, if a president gets killed (as happened to Kennedy) then millions may be affected, but would probably lead to other responses than if this happens to a close relative.

Such an investigation might then lead to a kind of network map (à la Latour) with different weight for different linkages. Latour’s discussion of mediations, translations, etc. would probably help in tracing the tenor of the responses, particularly when the original speaker (to channel conversational analysis) is not present for correcting a response. In this interactional/conversational processes, institutions can enter as either dampeners of further transmission, or as enhancers (consider how FaceBook enhanced extended family ties that had weakened, sometimes to nothing, and then reappeared).

References

Bateson, Gregory   1972    ” A re-examination of ‘Bateson’s rule'” in his Steps to an ecology of mind. Balentine Books.

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research as conversation with ancestors and peers

This is a development on a series of blogs on what Ray McDermott once called  “reply anthropology”
For some years, I have started the required initial course in a doctoral student’s career in the Programs in Anthropology at Teachers College, by asking them what is the concern that drives them and what is the audience they wish to reach. As I have thought further about it recently, this request fits within my interest in reconstructing “culture” not only as a produced state in history (the houses we inhabit) but as a producing moment in a long sequence of statements/actions triggered by earlier ones (that may be institutionalized as a state).

In other words, as Master to apprentice doctoral students, I consider it my task to help then craft (construct, write, say, [choose your verb]) a NEXT statement in the various conversations within which they will be caught (or into which they will crash). The one statement I am particularly responsible for is the crafting of their research (in proposals or dissertations) as contributions within the decades (indeed centuries) of anthropological debates so that 1) they can be heard 2) they move the conversation forward, and, 3) they do not reproduce, unwittingly, earlier statements that we hopefully buried but sometimes re-emerge under new guises (e.g. “culture of poverty”).

To think through the implications of this stance, it makes sense to generalize what conversational analysts have taught us over the past half-century. For example, take “inequality”—a classic concern in the literature and one about all students come with. Take Rousseau on the matter who presented the concern as a universal one.  Three centuries later Graeber and Wengrow (2021) present it as a particularly “Western” (18th century and beyond European then American) one that puzzled some among the Wendat Confederacy as they started interacting, or as I would now say, conversing with the Europeans invading their lands. (See also Dumont [1961] 1980).

What is one now to do with, that is respond to, the various challenges?  An initial response is the polite, and somewhat condescending, common framing of some ancestor as “a person of their time.” Rousseau is collectively known as one of the oldest ancestor of the current social sciences (Durkheim [1918] 1960, Lévi-Strauss [1962] 1976). Durkheim stressed Rousseau taking on Hobbes on the foundations of society. Lévi-Strauss stresses Rousseau’s responding to Descartes on his centering on his own thinking, rather than taking into account the multiplicity of ways to be human that delighted Lévi-Strauss. Neither Durkheim nor Lévi-Strauss picked on the future of Rousseau in politics.
Recently, G&W  acknowledged this and attempted to re-place him as one of the many who misled the social sciences, and particularly anthropology. G&W attempt a new NEXT to stress aspects of the overall human record otherwise obscured. Rousseau’s own NEXT is, famously, summarized in the first sentence in his Discourse on the origin of inequality: “The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying ‘This is mine,’ and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society.”W&G pick up on what they call Rousseau’s myth of the “stupid savage” (2021: 73) in which they the find a prestatement of the European 19th century justification for colonization. Arguably, this myth, rewritten many times, is behind all “development” schemes of the 20th century.

Some will see here a prefiguration of Marx against private property. I find it redolent of “culture of poverty” as it tars the other people around the first man as “simple” (naive, ignorant, primitive, underdeveloped…). Others have seen him as encouraging the worst aspects of several revolutions.

Was Rousseau (Marx, Durkheim, W&G) a “man of his time”? Of course (what other time would he be of?)! But… he was also a “man against his time.” Strictly speaking he was a man writing something in response to a question asked by the very established Académie de Dijon “whether the reestablishment of the sciences and the arts contributed to purifying morals.” Rousseau’s response displaces the topic and opens the way both to political and analytic developments. Subsequent revolutions and theories of social structure themselves transformed further responses in conversations that are continuing. Such statements are made in a certain times but those that we remember construct a new time when, as Lévi-Strauss once put it “individual works … are adopted on a collective mode” (1971: 560). Or, to translate this into a generalized form of conversational analysis, “a statement by one speaker responding to an earlier statement moves a conversation if it is picked up by another speaker.” Of all those who responded to the question asked by the Académie de Dijon only one is remembered and his discourse is now “myth” in the strongest form of the word.

So, the “time” (culture, identity, habitus) provide the material (intellectual, institutional, and material) and, to use a word I am now appropriating by generalizing it, “triggers” some NEXT statement. But the “time” does not shape the statement into itself for the statement can change, however locally, the “time.” When Rousseau died in 1778, the world of 18th century Europe was not the world of his birth in 1712, as he, and quite a few others (Hobbes, Hume, the Iroquois, various kings, dukes and princesses, etc.), had responded to the challenges other put to them. This NEXT world answered by waging various revolutions (in the Americas and Europe) and wars (Hobbes, Hume, the Iroquois, various kings, dukes and princesses, etc.) that triggered further developments, up to this day.

Let’s formalize this further by looking again at what should now be a classic ethnographic case: Goodwin series of article on “Chil,” a man with severe aphasia (2002, 2003, 2004, 2010). In summary, the series, building on Goodwin’s earlier work in conversational analysis, is ostensibly about constructing or accomplishing “sense” or “meaning” as a joint activity. This happens as “Chil’s action is deeply indexical in that it emerges within a sequential context that provides strong projections about what a move he might make there will be concerned with.” (2004: 60). The emphasis is on the sequence of turns (moves, statements) in a conversation which produces what any turn “means’ and what the whole conversation (or part of it) might be “about.” Goodwin emphasizes the complexity of maintaining a conversational order by various means, many not syntactic, to confirm that a statement (turn) has done something opening the way for a NEXT statement answering a possibility within the first. In the usual words the “meaning” of the initial statement is confirmed by the “meaning” of the next statement, this being confirmed by what happens in the third statement (which can either be a “OK, you got it” or “this is not what I meant.” In the Chil series Goodwin documents how Chil and his interlocutors accomplished various things, from telling stories, to joking, to explaining why oranges cannot be taken from California to Florida. While the last episode is from an unpublished paper, it involves the specific “doing” of something: Chil refuses the gift of an orange and explains why the gift should not be accepted. The issue here then is not just “meaning” but “action”: conversations, like speech, “act.” And by acting they may not only restore a threatened order, or make it even more ordered (“islanding”), but conversations can also lead the assembled interlocutors (even those who may not have been directly involved) onto paths not until then explored.

(Note that I am not talking here about the recent cliches that invoke “starting a national conversation about [race, gender, etc.]”—unless one considered that most of those have actually been going on for generations and may not take those caught with them some of them might want to go)

References

Dumont, Louis   1980   “Caste, Racism and ‘Stratification’.” .

Durkheim, Emile   1960   Montesquieu and Rousseau Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.

Goodwin, Charles   2004   “A Competent Speaker Who Can’t Speak: The Social Life of Aphasia.” Journal of Linguistic Anthropology. 14, 2: 151-170.

Goodwin, Charles   2010   “Constructing Meaning through Prosody in Aphasia.” In Prosody in interaction. Edited by D. Barth-Weingarten, E. Reber, and M. Selting. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. pp. 373-394.

Goodwin, Charles   2003   Conversational frameworks for the accomplishment of meaning in aphasis In Conversation and brain damage. Edited by Charles Goodwin. Oxford University Press. pp. 90-116.

Goodwin, Charles, and M. Goodwin and D. Olsher   2002   Producing sense with nonsense syllables: Turn and sequence in conversations with a man with severe aphasia In The language of turn and sequence. Edited by C. Ford, B. Fox, and S. Thompson. New York: Oxford Academic. pp. 56-80.

Graeber, David, and David Wengrow   2021   The dawn of everything: A new history of humanity New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude   1976   Jean-Jacques Rousseau, founder of the sciences of man .

Lévi-Strauss, Claude   1981   The naked man New York: Harper & Row.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques   1997   Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Change and order in American modes of address and modes of reference

Once upon a time, during my first two decades at Teachers College (in the department of, at first, Home & Family Life later reconstituted as Family & Community Education), I was addressed as “[FIRST NAME]” by colleagues and students alike. Twenty years, as I entered the programs in anthropology, I was addressed, like all my colleagues, as “Professor [LAST NAME].” In neither case did I have much of a choice (except to use these practices, changes and stabilities, to think further about poetry and constraints, culture and power—as well as resistance (“oddity,” “ignorance,” “agency”?).

Note that I only have evidence about the generality of the practices as they concerned “modes of address” in relatively public settings I have less evidence for “modes of reference” used by colleagues and students. Most of this evidence come from my own use in mostly private settings when I kept (and keep) referring to colleagues (and students) as [LAST NAME] (no honorific). Early in my career, I was once corrected by the president of Teachers College who had heard me refer to him as “Cremin” when I should have said “Larry.” So now I “learned,” or, rather, got into the habit of referring to colleagues as [FIRST NAME] when in company with colleagues (while continuing to refer to them as [LAST NAME] in other settings.

Here is everything that led Durkheim to write about “social facts” that are also “total” (as Mauss developed it) as well as “immortal”(as Garfinkel later put it). Wondering about naming practices must lead to something like what Durkheim, Mauss, Garfinkel (and many others) proposed since what might appear as only “habit” (if not habitus, or water for the fish) is accompanied by complex discourses that are triggered at any time when some challenge the practice (or ignore it).

The recent interest in language “ideologies” that is discourses about what language to use, how to do it, write it, etc., belongs to the same concerns.

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“Factions” AND their critique as an American total social fact

I concluded my earlier post () with a challenge: Should anthropologists continue to report all evidence of class (what I refer to here as “factions” based on race, genders, orientations, etc.) in the United States as an “American Dilemma” (Myrdal 1944), or as a conflict between “Dream and Reality” (Warner 1953; and passim in the literature), or, as I would suggest, constitutive of each other? Any answer is so heavily loaded in, precisely, America that anthropologists should maybe walk away from the questions and simply (!) provide the detailed, and theoretically well grounded, descriptive accounts that only they can produce. How the work may then be used for political purposes should remain a separate issue.

I had started by noting how Francis Hsu (1972) interpreted the emphasis on dilemmas and tensions as evidence of the unquestioned grounding of American social science in the core American ideological apparatus. Actually, Louis Dumont had made an even more radical point starting with his “Caste, Racism and ‘Stratification'” ([1961] 1980) and continuing in his exploration of the rise of individualistic discourses in Europe and then across the Atlantic ([1983] 1986). Both made the fundamental anthropological point that comparative evidence suggests that the emphasis on (in-)equality is a very American (Western?) thing.

Continue reading “Factions” AND their critique as an American total social fact

Class, culture & America (or Culture, class & America, or America: Culture and class): Ethnography and interpretation(s)

The earliest anthropologists were certain that they could use their methods and theories to understand “America.” Some (M. Mead, L. Warner) did, directly, and then soon many more have been certain that they could contribute to some understanding of the United States (its problems, futures, etc.). In this century-old and ongoing conversation some things have remain surprisingly stable. Over the generations ethnographers have reported observing, or hearing, very similar things. Not surprisingly, they have greatly differed in their interpretation of what they observed. I muse today about the implications of the tension between the perennity of observations and the shifting of the interpretations.  Where might anthropologists go from here?

Continue reading Class, culture & America (or Culture, class & America, or America: Culture and class): Ethnography and interpretation(s)

Teachers College and “Family”

From Arts (practical), to Life (psychological), to Education (social) in the attempts to understand and analyze, in order to educate about, perennial concerns with the settings in which men, women, and children meet most intimately and extensively over the course of their lives—in a word “in families.” For a new re-integration.

This post was triggered by my hearing that the administration of the College is considering closing the Center on the Family as Educator. The creation of this Center was, as I see it, one of Lawrence Cremin’s signal academic achievements, I was moved to wonder wherefrom what moved much of my career at TC came from, dialogically. I may transform this into a fuller article.

In 1972, I joined the College into the Department of Home and Family Life, later to become the Department of Family and Community Education. I published much on matters of family and education. I did not necessarily think much about what was sustaining these concerns, institutionally. And so, now, I wonder what TC has been doing with “family” over the past century since it appears it has done much, or little. I wonder what has been included, or indexed. And I wonder whether it should continue to do something about “it” and, if so, what now. This question is partially historical, and partially programmatic.

In my beginning (Fall 1972):
My first introduction to the informal history of Teachers College came when I was shown the closet within which, I was told, were kept the teaching tools of what I did not yet know as “the Table Service Lab.” This closet contained a full set of china and silverware that, by all evidence had not been used for many decades. The department I was joining, “Home and Family Life,” for a reason I did not immediately understand, was the inheritors by default of this closet and its content. young women learning how to serve formal dinnersI was also shown, and often used, the “Tudor Room” which, I was also told at some point was a copy of Miss Grace Dodge’s dining room. I was delighted when, decades later, I found out that this Tudor Room had been the Table Service Lab!

In TC’s beginning(s) (1880, 1884, 1889):
Once upon a time, in those days (1880), some philanthropists in New York, led by Miss Grace Dodge, created the “Kitchen Garden Association” for the “promotion of the domestic industrial arts among the laboring classes … the better to qualify them for domestic service” (Russell 1937: 4-5). Four years later this became the “Industrial Education Association” “to include ‘special training of both sexes in any of those industries which affect house and home directly or indirectly’” (Russell 1937: 9). And then, in 1889, the same principals “incorporated” a subsequent institution “under the name of Teachers College” (Russell 1937: 7). All versions of the history of this institution emphasize the shift to the education of teachers as the best route to helping the “laboring classes” (and particularly the arriving crowds from the poorest, most rural parts of Europe) succeed (survive?) in the United States. Much of the details in this post come from the Cremin, Shannon and Townsend history of Teachers College (1954) but this history does not go in much details about what must have extended and difficult conversations.

Histories of TC then most often jump to Dewey writing about “democracy and education” (in a book that should have been titled Democracy and Public Schooling), to Dewey’s debate with Thorndike, to difficult conversations with Columbia University, etc.

What becomes veiled in these accounts is the fact that some early concerns had not been discarded. It is significant that, among of the first buildings at the Morningside Campus were the building for the Industrial Arts (Macy), and, my focus here, Grace Dodge Hall erected so “that the ennobling arts of the home [would be] taught to coming generations” (from the plaque in the entrance to the building). dedication plaque for Grace Dodge HallWhat is also often veiled is the continued inclusion in the curriculum of matters related to these “ennobling arts.” As late as 1935, the TC catalogue listed in its fields of specialization “Household Arts and Household Arts Education” with courses in “Household economics,” “Cookery,” “Clothing,” “Teaching of Home Economics in schools.”

By 1937 the list of courses included courses in nutrition, health, child development and, most significantly given future history, a course in “family social relations.” Some of these were offered through different departments even as the old department was reorganized into a department of “Home Economics.” This department brought together most of the earlier matters but developed what became its full focus: psychological development and emotional life within a nuclear family. This transformation could probably be traced directly to the concomitant development of both Freudian therapeutic psychology (in its many transformations), and concerns with child development—as well as sociology. Ernest Osborne, who had earned a Ph.D. in Educational Psychology, was appointed in the Department of Curriculum and Teaching in the specialization in early childhood education. He started teaching a course in the “Psychology of Family Relations” (still taught as “Dynamics of Family Interaction”), and then became the prime mover of the new version of the venerable department which became, by 1953, the “Department of Home and Family Life” (Hey 1965: 134-5) . As Osborne put it in 1939:

It was once believed that parent education was a relatively simple thing limited to the instruction of parents in the proper ways of feeding, clothing, and training children . … Today .. . an increasing realization of the effects of relationship between family members on behavior is evident. (Quoted in Hay 1965: 134)

Over in Harvard, Talcott Parsons wrote a soon to become extremely controversial article on the family where women were to hold the “expressive role” in order to socialize children and stabilize adult personalities (1955: 16). Teachers College was again at the cutting edge in the transformation of an academic consensus into an educational program to apply this knowledge.

And then, as more time passed and Teachers College became my world:
I am not exactly sure what happened in the mid-1960s. I was told in my first years at TC, that, after Osborne died, the faculty of the programs in clinical psychology took umbrage at a program which appeared to give doctorate to people who would then engage in (family) therapy away from their own controls. At the same time, Lawrence Cremin got convinced that, as he put it, “education proceeds from many institutions” and particularly from families. He recruited Hope Leichter, a sociologist from the Harvard Department of Social Relations, whom he promoted, made chair of what was still “Home and Family Life” with the goal of transforming it into a department of “Family and Community Education.” This transformation was completed in 1976. Paul Vahanian, the last professor with a family therapy background, was not replaced when he retired. Rather, Leichter, Cremin and the others concerned with the matter invited anthropologists to join the evolving department (me from Chicago, and Ray McDermott from Stanford).

And then, in 1990, Teachers College, that is its administration on the basis of a recommendation by a faculty committee, closed the department and the faculty scattered.

I tell this story to make a point that keeps being obscured or, at best, side-lined: some at Teachers College always insisted that a school of education must pay attention to whatever one might want to call the institutions that take care of children when the children are not in school, or are the resting places of adults when they leave their salaried jobs.

A few at TC, I am sure, may still be willing to argue for what may have moved Grace Dodge even as she accepted that the institution she was fostering would focus on school teaching. It remains that, even in the 21st century, educators should not ignore the people who prepare the children for school, pick them up in the afternoon, clothe them, feed them, put them to bed, manage their health, and control, or not, what they read, what they watch, what they have access to in the social media of their times, etc. There is no point in rehearsing tired controversies about defining “family,” “home,” the “domestic,” etc. The reality is that, after two centuries of reformers proposing a world where children would be raised by the State, none of these utopias have survived long. Everywhere, children escape the State and yet, since the Coleman report at least (1966), and fully confirmed since, their familial experiences can challenge the State. One cannot understand “systemic privilege” without understanding the educative work of families, including their work educating themselves about schooling. This has been one of Ed Gordon (Varenne, Gordon and Lin 2009; Lin, Gordon and Varenne 2010) major contributions as he has been asking us to pay attention to what he has called “supplementary education.” It remains essential that it not be ignored.

In (temporary) conclusion, I wonder: how might we now integrate what is most easily told as a linear history: the joint concerns with the Arts of the domestic (economics, ecology, sustainability), Life with the most significant others (emotions, disabilities, cognition, development), and Education about all this (privilege, resistance, imagination).

 

Coleman, James et al. 1966 Equality of educational opportunity. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. (with et al.)

Cremin, Lawrence 1974 “The family as educator: Some comments on the recent historiography.”  Teachers College Record 76, 2: 250-265.

Cremin, Lawrence, David Shannon, and Mary Townsend 1954 A history of Teachers College, Columbia University. Columbia University Press.

Hey, Richard 1965 “Ernest G. Osborne Family Life Educator.” Journal of Marriage and Family , 27, 2: 134-138.

Lin, Linda, Hervé Varenne, and Edmund Gordon, eds. 2010 Educating Comprehensively: Varieties of Educational Experiences. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press,

Osborne, Ernest 1939 “Widening Horizons in Parent Education,” Teachers College Record, 41 p, 28.

Parsons, Talcott 1955 Family, socialization and interaction process. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press.

Russell, James 1937 Founding Teachers College. Bureau of Publications: Teachers College, Columbia University

Varenne, Hervé, Edmund Gordon and Linda Lin, eds. 2009 Theoretical Perspectives on Comprehensive Education: The Way Forward. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press.

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about ethnoethnography

I am always viscerally skeptical of fads in anthropology. Often, they disappear after only a few years, or move back into obscurity (“ontology”?) and I can ignore them. Others, like “identity” become mainstream and take over the discipline—as I discovered while playing “session roulette” at the AAA meetings over the past decades. So, often, I resist, though, sometimes, I attempt to appropriate some of what triggered me (to use a recent, and possibly useful, cliche). This is what I do today with what I would probably classify as the first kind of possibly obscure fad: autoethnography.

Autoethnography had been in my peripheral vision for a while and I found it easy to dismiss until I stumbled on the possibility that, after all, autoethnography was something I had always been doing, particularly in this blog. At that moment of course, the scholar in me noticed that I actually knew very little about the “official,” if not canonical, or at least most often cited, literature on the topic. So, I did what I suggest all doctoral students do when they shape bibliographies about topics that might be relevant to what they want to do, I explored the literature. Given that that we are well into the 21st century, I postponed going to the library and started by questioning ChatGpt.

I asked: “what is autoethnography?” On January 23, 2025 ChatGpt responded:

“Autoethnography is a qualitative research method that combines personal narrative with cultural analysis and interpretation. It allows researchers to use their own experiences as a lens through which to explore broader cultural, social, or organizational phenomena.”

I then asked: “Who are the 4 most cited authors using autoethnography?” ChatGpt responded:

Carolyn Ellis: A distinguished professor emerita … Her notable publications include … [Wikipedia]

Arthur P. Bochner: A distinguished university professor … has made significant contributions to narrative inquiry and autoethnography. His infuential works include … [Wikipedia]

Leon Anderson: Known for his seminal article “Analytic Autoethnography” (2006), Anderson…
[Oxford Research Encyclopedia]

H.L. (Bud) Goodall Jr.: A pioneer in autoethnography and narrative ethnography, Goodall authored … [Wikipedia]

I noted with some professorial satisfaction that ChatGpt now cites its sources which, of course, I double checked. I confirmed to my equal satisfaction that ChatGpt knows how to read and can be useful as a starting point, but it will not do much if you are wondering about the archaeological underpinning of autoethnography, its history within anthropology, or what to do next with it, if anything.

I dug further and looked at a 2017 paper by Susanne Gannon that was linked by the Oxford Research Encyclopedia.   This paper is titled “Autoethnography” and is summarized as follows:

Autoethnography is an increasingly popular form of postpositivist narrative inquiry that has recently begun to appear in educational contexts. The multiple lineages of autoethnography include the insider accounts of early anthropologists, literary approaches to life history and autobiography, responses to the ontological/epistemological challenges of postmodern philosophies, feminist and postcolonial insistence on including narratives of the marginalized, performance and communication scholarship, and the interest in personal stories of contemporary therapeutic and trauma cultures.

Ah Ah! As I suspected: ontology… postmodern… feminist… narrative…. marginalized… performance… trauma … educational contexts.

I was reminded of a mostly negative review I wrote (Varenne 1990) about two books published in the late 1980s. Both could be claimed by “authoethnography” (though they did not label themselves that way, or did not make into the current canon–as far as I can tell now). Both strongly emphasized that they were written by a particular individual with particular experiences. They were written by “’I’, an ex-hippie-estranged- graduate student, a man with a battered car, who (does not) get arrested by ‘Police Commissioner Rizzo’s dreaded Highway Patrol’” (Rose 1989: 1-19; Dorst 1989: 209-210). Rose is most extreme as a third of the book is dedicated to an “oneric flight through America” (1989: 78), a collage of extracts from letters “to his mother,” “to his advisor,” and fieldnotes that were actually specifically written for the book and could thus be considered “fictional”—though Rose probably would argue that this would have been true even if they had been written while he was in the field.

If what Gannon indexes, and what authors like Dorst or Rose did, is  indeed “authoethnography” then I would not do much with it and would warn students against it. But, if one looks beyond the box ChatGpt and Wikipedia summaries construct, then one finds that many anthropologists did write about their personal experiences in the field, often in quite personal ways.  So there may even be something to appropriate here.

Some examples from my personal canon:

The most classical of those, in my generation, was Lévi-Strauss’ Tristes Tropiques ([1955] 1963). More fun, and quite powerful as a teaching tool, is Laura Bohannan’s novel about her times with the Tiv of West Africa ([1954] 1964). She published it under the pseudonym Eleanor Bowen given her fears for her academic career. But it does everything an autoethnography should do: tell us much about the people and the challenges of learning about them so that she could report her experiences back to us. All of this is magnificently summarized in her most famous article: “”Shakespeare in the bush” (Bohannan 1966) where she tells, now under her own name, of what she was taught telling the story of Hamlet to the Tiv.  Another powerful ethnography is that of Robert Murphy chronicling the silencing of his body (1987).

One can go further outside the box to notice that it is quite common in recent ethnography for the author to reveal how they actually triggered what they then report. Tobin did something like this when he showed video sequences from one place to people from another place and made them comment (2011). Gilmore writes powerfully about her son and his friend constructing a language only them could understand (2016). Kalmar’s reports on farm workers from Mexico teaching each other English build on the ways the workers taught him how he, and his co-teachers, were actually ignorant so that they could notice a local knowledge usual methods might have not seen (2001). At some extreme one could say that all these are instances of the kinds of experiments Garfinkel devised as he challenged people to respond to the unknown or surprising.

One can go even further by making oneself the “subject” (“object”? depending on your ontological predilections) of the ethnography.  Take for example three tellings of my experiences in a large hospital in the large urban center of a galaxy far far away (Columbia Presbyterian in New York City) (Varenne 2018, 2019, 2021). In each case I place myself at the center, directly experiencing what the “natives” (as they would have been called a century ago) or “interlocutors” (as they may be referred to now) experience at such moments. As next of kin, or patient, I very much belonged in the set of natives/interlocutors of analytic concern in the literature on American medicine, from the least (say Glaser and Strauss on dying 1965) to the most (Foucault [1963] 1973) critical . At those times, I was not a (participant-)observer but rather a participant(-observer). I placed myself at the center.  I  hinted how these experiences triggered powerful emotional responses but those were not what I was concerned to publish.

Some therapists may have diagnosed me as in some sort of “denial” as I watched young policemen flirt while standing guard over a room next to the one where my wife laid unconscious after a severe stroke.  That I was in denial, or trying to defend myself emotionally, may be interesting but dwelling on it does not contribute to anthropology. What I have hoped may contribute, and is the rationale for much in this blog, is that the sketch of such a case may tell anthropologists more about moments in life that may be difficult of access. In this case (2019) I got to wonder about a classic problem with Lave’s model of the “community of practice” concerning the implicit boundary between the non-apprentice and the apprentice (or between the legitimate and illegitimate apprentice) that was highlighted as I, a non-apprentice in all the communities watched apprentices moving toward fuller participating into different communities (say physicians, nurses, policemen) while in continual contact across the “communities” thereby re-opening very classic issues in social systems where labor is divided. In another case (2021), I traced the movement through a social field which, at every stage, re-identified me into the kind of person they could deal with legitimately (e.g. the movement from the parking lot of the hospital into an operating room for heart surgery). In both cases, and in others, I used myself as a way to bypass the kind of IRB strictures that would make it very difficult, if not impossible, to follow a patient into an operating room so that we could understand in greater analytic detail how exactly bodies get disciplined (in Foucault’s terms).

Most classical ethnographies were specifically written to hide the author as a person.  The more recent include a “positionality” statement that is all too often only mentions a few traits (mostly gender and race, very rarely if ever religion, political ideology, age) without specifying how exactly these might have made a difference.  I would argue for example that this blog is “authorized” more by my status as a Full Professor in a Research One Institution than by my status as “white.”  This argument would then be developed into matters of theory and ethnography.

This would be good and leads to my conclusion today that  expanding the box to include all this will make anthropologists accept that all anthropology already is based in “autoethnography” and that those who discipline themselves to anthropology should just develop further how to make it useful for research and teaching purposes.

References

Bohannan, Laura   1966 Natural History 75:28-33.

Dorst John   1989     The written suburb. University of Pennsylvania Press

Gilmore, Perry   2016     Kisisi (our language). Wiley Blackwell

Glaser, Barney and Anselm Strauss   1965     “Temporal aspects of dying as a non-scheduled status passage.”  American Journal of Sociology 71:48-59.

Foucault, Michel   [1963] 1973 The birth of the clinic: An archaeology of medical perception. Pantheon Books.

Kalmar, Tomas   2014     2001 Illegal alphabets and adult literacy: Latino migrants crossing the linguistic border. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude   2014     Tristes tropiques. Publisher

Murphy, Robert   1987     The body silent. Henry Hold & Co.

Rose, Dan   1989 Patterns of American culture: Ethnography and estrangement. University of Pennsylvania Press.

Tobin, Joseph and M. Karasawa   2011 Preschool in three cultures revisited: China, Japan, and the United States.  University of Chicago Press.

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Musings about possibilities in the scholarly life of a professor of education and anthropologist