Here are Four of Cremin's statements 'defining,' 'specifying,' 'conceiving of' education. These guided his historiography and should, I believe, also guide the ethnographic work of anthropologists concerned with education as a fundamental aspect of human culture.

1974 "Further notes toward a theory of education"  Notes on Education. Published by the Institute of Philosophy and Politics of Education. Teachers College, Columbia Univeristy 4: 1-5. 1975 "Public Education and the Education of the Public."   Teachers College Record 77: 1-12. 1976 Public education.  New York: Basic Books 1978 "Family-Community linkages in American education: Some comments on the recent historiography."   in Families and communities as educators.   Edited by H. Leichter, 567-658.   New York: Teachers College Press
Once one defines education as the deliberate, systematic, and sustained effort to transmit or evoke knowledge, attitudes, values, skills, and sensibilities, one is immediately aware of the multiplicity of institutions that educate-families and churches, schools and oolleges, museums and libraries, summer camps and settlement houses. Whether consciously or not, such institutions tend at any given time to relate to one another in what might be called configurations of education. Each of the institutions within a configuration interacts with the others and with the larger society that
sustains it and is in turn affected by it. Configurations of education also interact, as configurations, with the larger society that sustains them and is in turn affected by them.

The important fact is that family life does educate, religious life does educate, and work does educate; and, what is more, the education of all three realms is as intentional as the education of the school, though in different ways and in different measures.

Every family has a curriculum, which it teaches quite deliberately and systematically over time. Every church and synagogue has a curriculum, which it teaches deliberately and systematically over time—the Old and New Testaments, after all, are among our oldest curricula, and so are the Missal and the Mass, and so is the Book of Common Prayer. And every employer has a curriculum, which he teaches deliberately and systematically over time; and the curriculum includes not only the technical skills of typing or welding or reaping or teaching but also the social skills of carrying out those activities in concert with others on given time schedules and according to established expectations and routines. One can go on to point out that libraries have curricula, museums have curricula, boyscout troops have curricula, and day-care centers have curricula, and most important, perhaps, radio and television stations have curricula—and by these curricula I refer not only to programs labeled educational but also to news broadcasts and documentaries (which presumably inform), to commercials (which teach people to want), and to soap operas (which reinforce common myths and values).

I HAVE FOUND IT fruitful to define education as the deliberate, systematic, and sustained effort to transmit, evoke, or acquire knowledge, attitudes, values, skills, or sensibilities, as well as any outcomes of that effort. The definition stresses intentionality, though I am well aware that learning takes place in many situations where intentionality is not present. It makes room for study as well as instruction, thereby embracing the crucial realm of self-education. And it acknowledges that behavior, preferences, and tastes are involved, as well as knowledge and understanding. It sees education as a process more limited than what the sociologist would call socialization or the anthropologist enculturation, though obviously in-clusive of many of the same phenomena. And it recognizes that there is often conflict between what educators are trying to teach and what is learned from the ordinary business of living.

 

I have conceived of education in this essay as the deliberate, systematic, and sustained effort to transmit, evoke, or acquire knowledge, attitudes, values, skills, or sensibilities, and any learning that results from the effort, direct or indirect, intended or unintended. This definition obviously projects inquiry beyond the schools and colleges to a host of individuals and institutions that educate - parents, peers, siblings, and friends, as well as families, churches, synagogues, libraries, museums, settlement houses, and factories. And it clearly focuses attention on the relationships among the several educative institutions and on the effects of one institution's efforts on those of another. What is needed most for a sound historical understanding of these relationships -- or linkages, as I have called them here -- is a variety of investigations that study them in their own right, with explicit educational questions uppermost in mind... Meanwhile, until such studies become plentiful, the kind of secondary analysis of extant monographs that has constituted the burden of my commentary here can surely produce at least two sorts of fruitful insights: first, into the shifting relationships among educative institutions at different times in American history and, second, into the character and operation of the relationships themselves. (p. 567)
  To specify this range of institutions is to save us from the Deweyan polarity of all life being broadly educative and overwhelmingly powerful and the school being intentionally educative but not very powerful at all. Rather, we have a theory of education in which each of the major educative agencies performs a mediative role with respect to the others and with respect to society at large. The family mediates the culture, and it also mediates the ways in which relig­ious organizations, television broadcasters, schools, and employers mediate the culture. Families not only engage deliberately and systematically in the teach­ing of knowledge, values, attitudes, skills, and sensibilities, they also screen and interpret the teaching of churches, synagogues, television broadcasters, schools, and employers. Similarly, the school not only engages deliberately and systematically in the teaching of knowledge, values, attitudes, skills, and sen­sibilities, it also interprets the teaching of families, churches, synagogues, tele­vision broadcasters, and employers. One can go on and work out all the per­mutations and combinations. What is more, these various institutions mediate the culture in a variety of pedagogical styles—think of the differences between what Jerome Bruner has called enactive education, ikonic education, and sym­bolic education, and the different combinations of these styles that pertain in different situations at different times. Further, these various institutions mediate the culture via different technologies for the recording, sharing, and distributing of symbols. In effect, they define the terms of effective participa­tion and growth in the society. Remaining within the broad Deweyan context, we can posit a new formulation: the theory of education becomes the theory of the relation of various educative interactions and institutions to one another and to the society at large. 

The definition is latitudinarian, in that it permits us several angles of vision with respect to the interplay of generations. Education may be viewed as intergenerational, with adults teaching children (the historian Bernard Bailvn once defined education as "the entire process by which culture transmits it-self across the generations") or with children teaching adults one thinks of immigrant families in which children, having learned the new culture relatively rapidly, become its interpreters to parents and grandparents); it may be viewed as intragenerational (recall Robert F. Berkhofer's account of Protestant missions to the American Indians in Salvation and the Savage [1965], which makes such apt use of the concept of acculturation); or it may be viewed as a self-conscious coming of age (so often the leitmotif of the reflective memoir or autobiography).

 
 

Now, permit me to go on to my third point, namely, the implications of this analysis for policymaking in education. I would put forward three assertions: first, that we have to think comprehensively about education; second, that we have to think relationally about education; and third, that we have to think publicly about education. Let me take each of these up in turn.

The definition also projects us beyond the schools and colleges to the multiplicity of individuals and institutions that educate—parents, peers, siblings, and friends, as well as families, churches, synagogues, libraries, museums, summer camps, benevolent societies, agricultural fairs, settlement houses, factories, radio stations, and television networks. It alerts us to the numerous occupational groups (only some of which have been professionalized) associated with educational institutions and to the variety of pedagogies they employ. And it suggests the fact that each of these pedagogies tends at a given time to impinge on the others. Thus, revivalist preaching doubtless influenced familial instruction in the nineteenth century, while Sesame Street unquestionably influences kindergarten instruction in our own.

 
  First, thinking comprehensively. We have traditionally assumed in the United States that the public school for more than a century created and recreated the American public, virtually singlehandedly, and endowed that public with its unique capability of working cooperatively on social problems, despite its ethnic, racial, religious, and class heterogeneity. The assumption, of course, is not without foundation. The public school has labored mightily over the years to nurture certain common values and commitments and to teach the skills by which a vastly variegated society can resolve its conflicts peacefully rather than by the methods of guerrilla warfare. Indeed, the public school has actually come to symbolize the quest for community in American society. But the public school has never functioned alone or in isolation. Where it has suc­ceeded, it has functioned as part of a large configuration of institutions, includ­ing families, churches, Sunday schools, and reform schools, committed to es­sentially complementary values. When the configuration has disintegrated, however, as it has from time to time in our larger cities, and when the cen­trifugal forces of heterogeneity have overbalanced the centrifugal forces of community, the public school has been less successful. My assertion is not the powerlessness of public schooling—far from it—but rather the limitations of public schooling. And the moral is simple: The public school ought never to take the entire credit for the educational accomplishments of the public, and it ought never to be assigned the entire blame.

Finally, the definition grants that education ordinarily (though not necessarily) produces outcomes, some of which may be intended and some unintended, and indeed that the unintended outcomes may be more significant than the in-tended. It also grants that other phenomena, from politics to commerce to technology to earthquakes, may produce even more significant changes in understanding, behavior, or sensibility than education. There are some who would consider all such phenomena educative, for they invariably shape human beings and affect their destinies. I find their definition so inclusive as to be meaningless. We obviously learn many things that no one sets out to teach us and that we ourselves do not set out to learn. No one interested in education can afford to ignore such incidental learning, but to call it education is to blur and confuse that critical realm of human activity in which individuals seek purposefully and planfully to bring about changes in their own or others' thinking, behavior, or sensibilities.

 
       
       
       
       
       
April 2008