Required reading:
- Williams, Raymond Marxism and literature. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. 1977.
(Parts I [particularly Chap. 1,2,4] & II; [particularly Chap. 1,2,4,6,7,8])
These notes are the twelfth in a series
of fifteen lecture for my class Culture and Communication.
This develops a set of lectures on the most powerful critiques of structuralist
thinking about cultural patterning and systematicity in interaction.
Transition notes |
Over the semester we have seen three models of sociability, that
is of what it is that can keep human beings together, in communication:
- consensus (Dewey, dominant interpretations of G.H.Mead,
and most intepretations of Boasian culture theory from Benedict
to Geertz)
- contract (Saussure as development over Durkheim)
- feedback through the response of "the thirds" (System
theorists, my interpretation of G.H. Mead and discourse analysis)
At the same time we have discussed two types of arbitrariness:
arbitrariness in perception and classification (through Benedict)
and in the identification of distinctions about human beings (through
the readings on gender [which could
also have been readings on race]). In both cases we approached the
issue of the consequences of this arbitrariness but left aside the
matter of the processes that allow for this arbitrariness to maintain
("reproduce," "reconstruct," "reconstitute")
itself.
|
HEGEMONY
- A development on one of Marx's
most famous pronouncement:
- Given Marxism, there is here a paradox: what are the processes
through which ruling classes (genders, ethnic or racial groups,
etc.) impose their "ideas" to the ruled classes?
- Williams and culture as "active experiences and practices"
within complex social structures
- but no theory of legitimate hegemony (sovereignty?), and thus
no theory of education.
|
Addressing this matter of the maintainance of arbitrariness
across the generations and when this arbitrariness is hard on large groups
of individuals within a population opens question of power within social
fields, societies, zones of interaction, etc.
In one way of another, the classical versions of the models of sociability
left aside the issue of differentiation within the body politic and inequalities
in resources or power. More recent versions have tried to deal with it
in a variety of fashions. This is Williams's concern (p.
108).
First we must understand the nature of the power. We can then explore
one of the ways of doing this.
- A development on one of Marx's
most famous pronouncement:
- Note the implicit (but very close to the surface
moral tone: this analysis is by no means value-neutral in its rhetorical
presentation. This is an analysis intended to move people to action
(education). It is also an analysis that does not point at the principles
guiding its moral choices.
- How does such an analysis apply to the United
States? America?
- Underlying this statement is a classical puzzle
in Euro-American political philosophy: how is one to understand political
rule (outside of pure relationships of brute force) and how is one to
constitute new forms of political rule that are both grounded in the
nature of humanity and in the moral choices in favor of individual freedom
and self-actualization that "we" have made?
- One of the earlier statement of the nature of
this puzzle can be found in Rousseau
discussion of the "social
contract" that starts with the striking paragraph:
MAN is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. [...] What
can make it legitimate?.
Rousseau (The
social contract, 1762)
- The earliest major attempts to constitute
forms that would be both natural and moral were argued during the
American revolution
- Declaration
of Independence (examine such phrases as "self-evident
truths," "men created equal," "Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed"...
- What happens when you start doubting that there are in fact no condition
under which "consent" can be considered as given by all
the governed? And, in particular, what happens in complex societies
when it can be shown that people occupying different positions have
different interests that must somehow conflict with each other if in
fact these positions are mutually constituted through the division of
labor (or even simple coexistence within the same geographical area)?
what are the processes through which ruling classes (genders, ethnic
or racial groups, etc.) impose their "ideas" to the ruled
classes?
- Is it enough to hold political power in order to impose ideas?
What are ideas anyway, and what role might they play in the reproduction
of class (gender...) positions?
- Gramsci
and hegemony
- In his words
- the
ruler and the ruled
- the
limits of economism (crass materialism)
- (as summarized by Williams)
- Bourdieu and
reproduction. The emphasis here is on hegemony as a way
of thinking (relating to ideology) that operates through processes
of internalization that Bourdieu borrows from the dominant interpretations
of G.H. Mead's social psychology.
- Williams and culture as "active experiences
and practices" (p. 111) leading to "studies of different types
of institution and formation in cultural production and distribution,
and in the linking of these within whole social material processes.
- Williams develops the theories of culture that we have been discussing
starting with the classical concerns with patterning in human communicational
systems (languages and Saussure; cultures and Benedict [see some
reflections
of culture and consciousness]) to a concern with the mechanisms
that may be involved in establishing and maintaining them, particularly
in complex societies.
- the fundamental nature of the division of labor and its
practical consequences (p. 108): the formation of "classes"
of people with
- different interests.
- different resources.
- different accesses to the means of expression.
- An emphasis on
- language as practical action (see also K.
Burke (1966, 1969) on rhetoric for a non-marxist approach; Austin
on speech acts);
- ideology as process
- "hegemony" (Chapter 6): "a
lived system of meanings and values--constitutive and constituting--which
as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally
confirming" (p. 110)
- Note that this definition is drifting
towards an internalization theory (as it will become in
Bourdieu's theory of the habitus) (p. 110)
- The problem may have to do,
in Gramsci's writing with the appearance that the working
classes do not "understand" their conditions.
Given the theories of language we have been discussing,
it should be clear that the appearance of non-understanding
is mostly produced by the absence of a particular type
of analytic language that is in fact only found among
certain intellectual classes.
- The import of this critique is that it establishes that one cannot
differentiate culture from society (motivation from action; personality
psychology from the social sciences) (as this was done by Parsons).
- One is moving beyond the distinction
between
"what people say" |
and |
"what people do" |
(Williams
p. 55, 59.
- Neither "say" or "do"
are primary. Language is one of the most powerful tool that
an agent can use to produce something in his/her social situations,
that is, with others similarly at work.
- Here again (40-41) Williams bows to
internalization theories but talks about "social facts"
"available in manifest communication."
- ["teleology"
in system theory?]
- Williams gets close to "constructivism"
as it was to be developed by Berger & Luckman (1966).
BUT hegemony
dominance (consciousness IS_NOT ideology
p. 109)
[dominance ???] emergence
(and tradition p. 122)
- but no theory of legitimate hegemony (sovereignty?),
and thus no theory of education.
- Williams operate fully within the political Marxist
mode of using heavy moral language (including the word 'hegemony')
to refer to common processes in all human societies.
- There is little evidence that Williams directly
addresses the grounds of his moral stance, nor that he discusses
why he might expect his readers to accept the implied stance.
This is common in "Marxist" writing and should be analyzed
as the symbolic marking of a voice, a rhetorical genre.
- Given the relative success of more or less Marxist
analyses of social processes, one might also analyze this genre
in terms of hegemony.
- But the very moral character of the writing, and
its shaping as a call for action, raises the question of the principle
of legitimacy: if the ruling ideas were simply the ideas of the
ruling classes, then there would be no ground for challenging them
except perhaps a raw, biological, "will to power" (sociobiology
and the attempt to maximize one's personal genes)
- But Marxists, like Christians, and Democrats of
all stripes (as well as Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims, etc.) precisely
reject this stance towards society: society is specifically made
according to principles we can specify and then use to measure our
products in our dialogues.
- A controversial case: political struggle through
the same hegemony
- Elian Gonzales:
convincing/conviction (particularly at the time of the raid and
in the description of the various actors) through symbols of
- gender: a female immigration officer / Marisleysis
as natural mother;
- kinship: a natural father / a woman who had
no children (Janet Reno);
- ethnicity: spanish speaking / (Marisleysis
as speaking in English); [but no mention of color];
- political legitimacy: the law / democracy
- medicine (physical): a flight surgeon [no
mention of gender];
- medicine (mental): a child pyschologist;
- child: toys (often referring back to mental
health, e.g. playdo) / toys (with reference to abundance);
- ideology in Time reporting: "No one would
be asked to choose between freedom and love" (April 17, 2000)
- etc.
- This "analysis" (or "deconstruction" in 1980's
language) can highlight all the ways through which the means used
in this controversy are artifical and arbitrary to any "absolute"
or "substance" thereby pointing at a pure issue of raw power (who
can point the bigger gun/who can riot effectively).
- It is absolutely ineffective in helping anyone
involved decide what to do next. In this sense deconstruction is
unable to help anyone involved in practice or applied work in formal
institutions (education, medicine, politics). To this extent it
fails to account for the human condition for we are always involved
in practice even in the less "formal" institutions (families, friendship
groups, etc.) in which we are continually at work
Some questions
(in the context of this course) |
- Taking any "idea" with common currency
these days (e.g. the United States as 'mosaic' or 'salad' bowl)
rewrite Marx's initial statement with this idea at its specific
content.
- What might be some of the 'ruling ideas' in
the United States?
- Taking a ruling idea like 'the separation
of Church and State' as it is applied to schooling, analyze the
tendency of the well-to-do to send their children to private schools.
Is this evidence for another ruling idea? for resistance on the
parts of the well-to-do?
- What are the dangers of associating "hegemony"
with particular persons?
|