Required reading:


These notes are the twelfth in a series of fifteen lecture for my class Culture and Communication. This develops a set of lectures on the most powerful critiques of structuralist thinking about cultural patterning and systematicity in interaction.
Transition notes
Over the semester we have seen three models of sociability, that is of what it is that can keep human beings together, in communication:
  1. consensus (Dewey, dominant interpretations of G.H.Mead, and most intepretations of Boasian culture theory from Benedict to Geertz)
  2. contract (Saussure as development over Durkheim)
  3. feedback through the response of "the thirds" (System theorists, my interpretation of G.H. Mead and discourse analysis)

At the same time we have discussed two types of arbitrariness: arbitrariness in perception and classification (through Benedict) and in the identification of distinctions about human beings (through the readings on gender [which could also have been readings on race]). In both cases we approached the issue of the consequences of this arbitrariness but left aside the matter of the processes that allow for this arbitrariness to maintain ("reproduce," "reconstruct," "reconstitute") itself.

 


HEGEMONY

  1. A development on one of Marx's most famous pronouncement:
  2. Given Marxism, there is here a paradox: what are the processes through which ruling classes (genders, ethnic or racial groups, etc.) impose their "ideas" to the ruled classes?  
  3. Williams and culture as "active experiences and practices" within complex social structures
  4. but no theory of legitimate hegemony (sovereignty?), and thus no theory of education.

Addressing this matter of the maintainance of arbitrariness across the generations and when this arbitrariness is hard on large groups of individuals within a population opens question of power within social fields, societies, zones of interaction, etc.

In one way of another, the classical versions of the models of sociability left aside the issue of differentiation within the body politic and inequalities in resources or power. More recent versions have tried to deal with it in a variety of fashions. This is Williams's concern (p. 108).

First we must understand the nature of the power. We can then explore one of the ways of doing this.

  1. A development on one of Marx's most famous pronouncement:
    The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas,
     
    i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force.
     
    The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it.
    ( The German Ideology (1970: 64))
    1. Note the implicit (but very close to the surface moral tone: this analysis is by no means value-neutral in its rhetorical presentation. This is an analysis intended to move people to action (education). It is also an analysis that does not point at the principles guiding its moral choices.
    2. How does such an analysis apply to the United States? America?

  2. Underlying this statement is a classical puzzle in Euro-American political philosophy: how is one to understand political rule (outside of pure relationships of brute force) and how is one to constitute new forms of political rule that are both grounded in the nature of humanity and in the moral choices in favor of individual freedom and self-actualization that "we" have made?

    1. One of the earlier statement of the nature of this puzzle can be found in Rousseau discussion of the "social contract" that starts with the striking paragraph:
      MAN is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. [...] What can make it legitimate?.
      Rousseau (The social contract, 1762)
    2. The earliest major attempts to constitute forms that would be both natural and moral were argued during the American revolution
      1. Declaration of Independence (examine such phrases as "self-evident truths," "men created equal," "Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed"...

  3. What happens when you start doubting that there are in fact no condition under which "consent" can be considered as given by all the governed? And, in particular, what happens in complex societies when it can be shown that people occupying different positions have different interests that must somehow conflict with each other if in fact these positions are mutually constituted through the division of labor (or even simple coexistence within the same geographical area)? what are the processes through which ruling classes (genders, ethnic or racial groups, etc.) impose their "ideas" to the ruled classes? 

  4. Is it enough to hold political power in order to impose ideas?  What are ideas anyway, and what role might they play in the reproduction of class (gender...) positions?
    1. Gramsci and hegemony
      1. In his words
        1. the ruler and the ruled
        2. the limits of economism (crass materialism)
      2. (as summarized by Williams)
    2. Bourdieu and reproduction.  The emphasis here is on hegemony as a way of thinking (relating to ideology) that operates through processes of internalization that Bourdieu borrows from the dominant interpretations of G.H. Mead's social psychology.
       
  5. Williams and culture as "active experiences and practices" (p. 111) leading to "studies of different types of institution and formation in cultural production and distribution, and in the linking of these within whole social material processes.
    1. Williams develops the theories of culture that we have been discussing starting with the classical concerns with patterning in human communicational systems (languages and Saussure; cultures and Benedict [see some reflections of culture and consciousness]) to a concern with the mechanisms that may be involved in establishing and maintaining them, particularly in complex societies.
       
    2. the fundamental nature of the division of labor and its practical consequences (p. 108): the formation of "classes" of people with
      1. different interests.
      2. different resources.
      3. different accesses to the means of expression.
         
    3. An emphasis on
      1. language as practical action (see also K. Burke (1966, 1969) on rhetoric for a non-marxist approach; Austin on speech acts);
      2. ideology as process
      3. "hegemony" (Chapter 6): "a lived system of meanings and values--constitutive and constituting--which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming" (p. 110)
        1. Note that this definition is drifting towards an internalization theory (as it will become in Bourdieu's theory of the habitus) (p. 110)
          1. The problem may have to do, in Gramsci's writing with the appearance that the working classes do not "understand" their conditions.  Given the theories of language we have been discussing, it should be clear that the appearance of non-understanding is mostly produced by the absence of a particular type of analytic language that is in fact only found among certain intellectual classes.
             
    4. The import of this critique is that it establishes that one cannot differentiate culture from society (motivation from action; personality psychology from the social sciences) (as this was done by Parsons).
      1. One is moving beyond the distinction between
        "what people say"
        and
        "what people do"
        (Williams p. 55, 59.
      2. Neither "say" or "do" are primary. Language is one of the most powerful tool that an agent can use to produce something in his/her social situations, that is, with others similarly at work.
      3. Here again (40-41) Williams bows to internalization theories but talks about "social facts" "available in manifest communication."
        1. ["teleology" in system theory?]
      4. Williams gets close to "constructivism" as it was to be developed by Berger & Luckman (1966).

        BUT hegemony

        dominance (consciousness IS_NOT ideology p. 109)

        [dominance ???] emergence (and tradition p. 122)
         
  6. but no theory of legitimate hegemony (sovereignty?), and thus no theory of education.
    1. Williams operate fully within the political Marxist mode of using heavy moral language (including the word 'hegemony') to refer to common processes in all human societies.
    2. There is little evidence that Williams directly addresses the grounds of his moral stance, nor that he discusses why he might expect his readers to accept the implied stance.  This is common in "Marxist" writing and should be analyzed as the symbolic marking of a voice, a rhetorical genre.
    3. Given the relative success of more or less Marxist analyses of social processes, one might also analyze this genre in terms of hegemony.
    4. But the very moral character of the writing, and its shaping as a call for action, raises the question of the principle of legitimacy: if the ruling ideas were simply the ideas of the ruling classes, then there would be no ground for challenging them except perhaps a raw, biological, "will to power" (sociobiology and the attempt to maximize one's personal genes)
    5. But Marxists, like Christians, and Democrats of all stripes (as well as Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims, etc.) precisely reject this stance towards society: society is specifically made according to principles we can specify and then use to measure our products in our dialogues.
       
  7. A controversial case: political struggle through the same hegemony
    1. Elian Gonzales: convincing/conviction (particularly at the time of the raid and in the description of the various actors) through symbols of
      1. gender: a female immigration officer / Marisleysis as natural mother;
      2. kinship: a natural father / a woman who had no children (Janet Reno);
      3. ethnicity: spanish speaking / (Marisleysis as speaking in English); [but no mention of color];
      4. political legitimacy: the law / democracy
      5. medicine (physical): a flight surgeon [no mention of gender];
      6. medicine (mental): a child pyschologist;
      7. child: toys (often referring back to mental health, e.g. playdo) / toys (with reference to abundance);
      8. ideology in Time reporting: "No one would be asked to choose between freedom and love" (April 17, 2000)
      9. etc.
         
    2. This "analysis" (or "deconstruction" in 1980's language) can highlight all the ways through which the means used in this controversy are artifical and arbitrary to any "absolute" or "substance" thereby pointing at a pure issue of raw power (who can point the bigger gun/who can riot effectively).
    3. It is absolutely ineffective in helping anyone involved decide what to do next. In this sense deconstruction is unable to help anyone involved in practice or applied work in formal institutions (education, medicine, politics). To this extent it fails to account for the human condition for we are always involved in practice even in the less "formal" institutions (families, friendship groups, etc.) in which we are continually at work
Some questions
(in the context of this course)
  • Taking any "idea" with common currency these days (e.g. the United States as 'mosaic' or 'salad' bowl) rewrite Marx's initial statement with this idea at its specific content.
  • What might be some of the 'ruling ideas' in the United States?
  • Taking a ruling idea like 'the separation of Church and State' as it is applied to schooling, analyze the tendency of the well-to-do to send their children to private schools. Is this evidence for another ruling idea? for resistance on the parts of the well-to-do? 
  • What are the dangers of associating "hegemony" with particular persons?