Section VIII

THE MEETING OF EDUCATIONAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY*

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Although both educators and anthropologists have always been more or less aware of the theoretical underpinnings of their respective fields, it is probably true that never have they been as acutely concerned with the import of those underpinnings as at the present time. In both fields one finds growing attention to the assumptions upon which research and practice inevitably, if precariously, rest. In both fields, also, one detects not only an abundance of fermentation and fresh insight in the area of theory, but perhaps an equal abundance of uncrystallized thinking and unrefined terminology.

The reasons for this heightened concern are no doubt themselves cultural. Melville Herskovits (1948, pp. 314 f.), one of the few anthropologists who has thus far paid sustained attention to education as an institution of culture, suggests that one may easily distinguish between the way it functions for a people like the Zuñi and for a more complex civilization because the one is relatively stable by comparison with the other:

> The homogeneity of the [Zuñi] culture makes for a unity of teaching objectives that reflect unity of cultural aims and methods of inculcating them in the young, and thus leaves little room for conflict between the directives given by different preceptors. . . . This conflict in directives is perhaps the source of the most serious difficulties in larger, less homogeneous societies, where the total educational process includes schooling as well as training in the home. Serious conflicts and deep-seated maladjustment may result from education received at the hands of persons whose cultural or sub-cultural frames of reference differ.

Although Morris Opler (1947) has pointed to the danger of oversimplifying this distinction, as Herskovits does also, it does seem obvious that today the divergence of educational methods and objectives in complex civilizations is widespread indeed—a divergence that is reflected not only in growing attention to and refinement of educational theory as a specialized discipline, but in deep-seated conflicts among its own spokesmen.

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Schools of all sorts are found to operate upon what I may call "meta-educational" assumptions, quite as fully as cultural beliefs and practices operate upon what the anthropological theorist, David Bidney (1953*a*) aptly terms metacultural assumptions.

Indeed, as might be expected in view of the ultimate if far from sufficiently delineated interdependence of education and culture, the same types of traditional philosophic categories may be utilized to characterize both fields of theory. Thus realism is an influential educational doctrine (Frederick Breed is a representative), but it is also influential in anthropology (Robert H. Lowie has been so classified). So too, among other doctrines, are idealism, historical materialism, neo-Thomism, and pragmatism. To be sure, these terms are not always manipulated with equal refinement, nor do the two fields always reveal exactly comparable meanings. Bronislaw Malinowski, to choose but one anthropologist, is undoubtedly closer to pragmatism than to any other current philosophic outlook; yet, as the philosopher Horace Friess (1950) has reminded us, his special way of adapting that doctrine to culture theory would scarcely satisfy the most influential American pragmatist and educational philosopher, John Dewey.

The difficulty with much of this kind of metacultural and meta-educational thinking, however, is that it claims more by way of explanation of the present struggles besetting both fields than it can easily justify. Bidney (cf. 1953*a*, pp. 25, 37 f.), for example, sometimes leaves the impression that he has satisfactorily interpreted, say, Alfred L. Kroeber when he labels this anthropologist as an objective idealist. The philosopher of culture, F. S. C. Northrop (1946), attempts a not dissimilar feat on a grand scale when he tries to explain Western civilization in terms of the philosophy of modern science, and Eastern culture in terms of aesthetic intuition. Similarly, various educational theorists seem to think they have finally understood Robert M. Hutchins when they classify him as an Aristotelian, or Alexander Meiklejohn as a Kantian.

Where these men frequently fall short is in failing to inquire carefully whether or not they have reached the limits of interpretation when they have discovered that educators and anthropologists, or even whole cultures, rest upon presuppositions that can be defined according to more or less established philosophic categories. Helpful, indeed indispensable, as these categories are, the problem that still remains is the nature of the intricate linkages between them and the cultural experiences with which they are properly associated. It is one thing, for example, to say that we have underscored the pragmatic premises upon which, to some extent, they undoubtedly rest. It is another thing to infer that we have thereby sufficiently revealed the origin, role, or practical significance of these premises. We still need to ask, after we have articulated them as clearly as possible, how and why pragmatism developed as it has in America. And we need to do so, I suggest, not merely by careful conceptualization or even by tracing it to earlier philosophies, such as the Hegelian, but by considering it as the symbolic corollary of a constellation of natural and

cultural phenomena that are, in numerous respects, indigenous to the American milieu. In short, the crucial problem is the venerable but far from solved one of the interlacing of ideas, concepts, categories, on the one hand, with nature, human experience, culture, on the other hand. If another instance of reductionism is not to be committed, we must avoid what I may term here the "philosophic fallacy"—a fallacy to which some anthropological and educational theorists seem singularly vulnerable.

Just how far anthropologists have thus far become sensitive to the context of political, economic, moral, and other influences upon their own frames of reference I am not qualified to say. It is, I confess, surprising to note such relative paucity of attention paid to the bearing of that context upon anthropological theory in such an imposing overview of the field as *Anthropology Today*. And it is at least plausible to ask if there has been anything like enough interdisciplinary effort thus far to incorporate into their own viewpoints the perspectives of such diverse nonanthropological interpreters of American cultural assumptions as Charles Beard, Harold Laski, Vernon Parrington, Merle Curti, or Thorstein Veblen.

It would be, of course, a gross exaggeration to contend that educational theory has proceeded much, if any, further in such an effort. Here, too, the disregard of or at least insensitivity to the reciprocity of "inarticulate major premises" and environmental influences is far more typical than not. At the same time, the dim outlines of a more adequate approach are at least discernible—an approach no doubt due in considerable part to the immense influence of Dewey, who insisted throughout his long professional life upon the interaction of ideas and events, and in part also to the practical character of schooling as an on-going institution in everyday American life. Thus, the conflicts rampant in education today—conflicts now commanding frequent attention even in mass-circulation magazines—are occasionally assessed by theorists in terms of what may in general be called, after Karl Mannheim (1936), the sociology of knowledge. Here the aim is always to explore the environmental motivations of educational theory as essential to the nature of that theory: the conditions of economic and social tension and crisis, for example; the technological and political revolutions sweeping our century; the abnormal rate of change from, say, the "inner-directed" to the "outer-directed" types of character analyzed by David Riesman (1950)—changes themselves possibly the consequence of these revolutions; and numerous other factors that are approachable only through a multidimensional interpretation in which conventional philosophic categories are a necessary but certainly not sufficient explanation of present educational bewilderments and struggles.

Granting that we have hardly begun to develop this kind of approach to any area of experience and knowledge, I wish nevertheless to illustrate what it might begin to mean in effecting a closer rapprochement between the two fields with which we are here primarily concerned. More particularly, I propose to select four among many more problematic concepts from anthropology and to suggest not only how these may be helpful to the tasks of American education, but how their consideration by educa-

tional theory viewed in the wider context referred to above may enhance their own importance and fruitfulness for anthropology. These four are: (1) the reality of culture, (2) process in culture, (3) values in culture, and (4) the integration of culture. In view of my purpose, it is obvious that I shall find it necessary to mention various facts and principles which, though familiar to members of one field, may be unfamiliar to the other. It is obvious, also, that each of these problematic concepts embraces so huge a territory that one can only hope at best to emphasize aspects of major relevance.

The frame of reference, if I may take the liberty of extending Mannheim's term, is an as yet embryonic methodology—the "metaculturology of knowledge"—metaculturology here being redefined provisionally as that encompassing discipline concerned with the assumptions of culture theory, and which accordingly includes not only the assumptions of anthropology, sociology, and all other sciences of man, but of the history and philosophy of culture as well.

II

The problem of the reality of culture refers to the disputes waged over locus, autonomy, and substance. The impression a layman receives from reviewing recent anthropological discussion is that, while in general there is now widespread agreement that culture connotes a level of human experience clearly indistinguishable from although related to all other levels of nature and humanity, there continues to be disagreement over its ontological status. If the anthropologist, Leslie White (1949*a*), is right in his historic survey, early pioneers such as Emile Durkheim were closer to the correct position than many recent theorists—the position that culture is a unique, objective level of reality, *sui generis*. White deplores, therefore, what he considers to be a retreat from this position by the majority of American anthropologists—Ralph Linton, Edward Sapir, and Ruth Benedict, to name but three—who, he feels, have reduced culture to merely psychological phenomena. Ironically, perhaps the two most vigorous American defenders of ontological substantialism are at opposite poles in their interpretation: White himself, who is sometimes called a historical materialist, and the sociocultural theorist, Pitirim A. Sorokin, who is a metacultural idealist. In passing, it should be noted that the *sui generis* position, however, subtle its ramifications, must also be assumed finally both by Marxian anthropologists (who consider the fountainhead of their doctrine to be Friedrich Engels' *Origin of the Family*), and by those subscribing to the metaphysics of Thomism (Father W. Schmidt no doubt being the most prominent).

Kroeber's long meditation upon the problem has led him to modify in crucial respects his own original hypostatic view of culture (1952, pp. 22 ff.). At least two recent statements (Kroeber, 1952, p. 121; Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952, pp. 148 f.) appear to take a clear-cut operational approach by holding that culture is not a reified substance but a functional abstraction by which certain kinds of human experience are delineated

and interpreted. Despite certain inconsistencies, this is likewise the main direction pursued by Malinowski (1944), as it is of such diverse figures as the self-styled "philosophical anthropologist," Ernst Cassirer (1944), and the anthropological theorist-practitioner, Clyde Kluckhohn (1949).

Now it is surely interesting, though not really surprising, that much the same type of dispute runs through educational philosophy (cf. Brameld, 1950). Although culture is seldom precisely defined, the meta-educational attitude presupposed by the two groups of theorists often called essentialists and perennialists is that it is largely an objectively posited level of reality. Despite important differences among them(perennialists are Aristotelians and Thomists, secular or ecclesiastic, while essentialists usually are modern realists or idealists), both groups incline strongly toward a pre-existent ontology of the cosmos, and therefore of the world of social institutions and events.

The consequences of this attitude for education are enormous. Learning becomes chiefly a process of stimulus-response, mental discipline, or some similar practice devoted mainly to absorption of and/or training for unity with the already given cultural environment. The notion widely assumed by some anthropologists that education is established to guarantee transmission of the cultural heritage is welcomed by essentialists and perennialists as confirming their own predilections as to the relation of the learner to the reality that is learned.

Against this general orientation, educational philosophy in America is characterized today by at least two other viewpoints, occasionally termed progressivism and reconstructionism. Like their counterpositions, these also have a great deal in common amidst genuine distinctions. While reconstructionism, for example, tends to emphasize more strongly the need for clearly enunciated cultural goals, both accept the operational way of interpreting nature and culture. Therefore both also emphatically reject a *sui generis* position. Being concerned with educational methods as instruments of social control, they tend to deny that education, formal or informal, is properly characterized as an agent merely of cultural transmission. Since they are deeply respectful of science they do not ignore, of course, the anthropological evidence for such transmission. They do question whether the evidence is thus far complete enough to warrant the hasty generalizations frequently made, and especially so in view of the scarcity of systematic investigations by anthropology or education as a distinct institution of culture.

The conception of learning developed by this second pair of philosophies also tends to depart radically from the first pair. Malinowski's anthropological functionalism, for example, is by no means foreign to the educational functionalism now widely taught under such a label as organismic psychology. Here learning centers in the activity of mediating the immediacies of experience, to use the language of Dewey (cf. 1916, 1939). That these immediacies are, if you please, the "givens" of nature and culture, and that they are very real, very stubborn, and sometimes overpowering, is certainly true. The inference from these characteristics that they

are *sui generis* existences in which man must either acquiesce or perish is, however, false—an inference plausible enough, in the face of long-standing unscientific habits and attitudes, but not therefore either logical or moral.

Education, in this framework, becomes normatively creative and re-creative rather than chiefly reflexive or reproductive. The major assumption is that habits of variation and exploration are cultivable, indeed that some cultures (our own most notably, perhaps) have to a considerable degree acquired amenability to habits of this kind at least as self-consciously as others have acquired alternative kinds. It follows that, since culture is entirely learned, education deliberately geared to modification or reconstruction can also be learned. The sociologist, Charles S. Johnson (1943, p. 4), speaking of "education and the cultural process," epitomizes the general view: "Education, thus is more than the transmission of culture from one generation to another. It is this transmission and it is also transformation of people who are more or less in conflict."

Although further examination would reveal certain overlappings between all four of the theories mentioned, just as there are overlappings between, say, White and Linton, a more important consideration here is whether we can detect any still wider significance for the problem of cultural reality as it bears upon both education and anthropology. Here, then, we approach the question of what a metaculturology of knowledge might begin to reveal as to the more pervasive reasons for the dispute.

One clue to an answer lies in the conflict within Western culture between what I shall call, in widest possible compass, an absolute-transcendental approach to nature, man, and society, on the one side, and an experimental-empirical approach, on the other side. This conflict is, of course, both ancient and multiple. While its most sophisticated formulation is philosophic, it is by no means merely or even primarily so either in origin or expression. Rather, it is religious, legal, industrial, familial, political, moral—indeed, one would have difficulty in sifting out any phase of Western experience which it has not invaded. Usually, we think of the Middle Ages as representing the dominance of the absolute-transcendental alternative, although we appreciate that this was by no means purely the case any more than modern civilization is purely experimental-empirical.

As a matter of fact, one of the most striking features of modern culture is that it has never emancipated itself from the heritage of medieval habits, beliefs, and practices—certainly not to anything like the extent suggested by Sorokin (1941) in calling our culture "sensate." Not only do most contemporary religious institutions perpetuate that heritage; so, too, do political institutions, including even American democracy with its anchorage of *a priori* axioms concerning equality, freedom, and the dignity of man.

Nor would we be wrong in recalling that modern science is far from immunized. On the contrary, as Jerome Frank (1945) among many others has shown, the mechanistic philosophy of science (first usually associated with Newton), which views the universe as an objective system of pre-

established law, is not only widely taken for granted even by some relativity physicists of our own day; it is, to an astonishing degree, assumed as the model to be emulated by social scientists as well. Recently, in those parts of the world controlled by communism, the absolutist outlook rationalized by dialectical materialism is officially espoused and enforced in all departments of life: in the natural and social sciences, in political indoctrination, and in every type of school.

The relevant conclusion here is that the problem both of cultural reality and of education's response to that reality is integral with the much wider problem of alternative ways of believing and acting in cultural experience. To be sure, these ways are made clearer both by anthropological and educational theories, just as they are by formal philosophies. One additional measure of such theories, however, derives from perception of the underlying currents of influence, ideological and otherwise, which play upon them at the same time that theories share in expressing and molding the influences themselves. In the problem under discussion, this may well mean, first of all, that the unresolved issue of the *sui generis* versus operational views of cultural reality, and likewise the unresolved issue of the essentialist-perennialist versus progressivist-reconstructionist views of education, are finally to be construed as metaculturological symbolizations of, because integral with, absolutist versus experimentalist institutions, attitudes, and habits that both precede and follow those symbolizations.

We need hardly be reminded, however, that any brief attempt to sketch the significance of our first problematic concept on such a huge canvas inevitably ignores innumerable qualifying factors. It should be borne in mind that this attempt is itself strictly operational. The test of its value lies in the extent to which it assists us in mapping a very large territory with a greater degree of potential and actual meaning, in developing greater consciousness of the network of interrelations of the two fields with which we are concerned, and in constructing the beginnings of a framework through which to approach our three remaining concepts.

III

By concept of process I refer, in general, to the cluster of questions centering in "the dynamics of culture change." That these are intimately connected with the concept of reality is evident, but not at all in the sense that the absolutist orientation denies change while the experimentalist accepts it. No anthropologist, regardless of his premises, would defend for a moment any notion of completely static culture; and no competent educator would defend any notion of completely static education. To be sure, the perennialist and certain essentialists regard time as subordinate to the timeless forms of reality, and this regard affects their final outlook upon the responsibilities of education. Even they, however, typically provide curricula and techniques that include recognition of changing events and needs with which students must be prepared to cope during their lives.

And yet, in an important sense, the absolutist view of culture approaches the problem of process from assumptions that tend to encourage consequences divergent from those of the operational interpretation; so, too, do conflicting philosophies of education. White, for example, still retains important features of the "evolutionary" thesis developed by such immortals of anthropology as Henry B. Tylor, Lewis H. Morgan, and Herbert Spencer—a thesis that presumes to detect in human history a unilinear progress from "savagery" through "barbarism" to "civilization." Despite differences, this is also broadly the Marxian doctrine—civilization in its highest form becoming the classless society of pure communism. In the history of American educational theory, the classical "evolutionary" position has never been more consistently expounded than by the neo-Hegelian philosopher and early United States Commissioner of Education, William T. Harris (1901), who, while scarcely hoping for the final emergence of a classless society, does find a melioristic trend in culture which it is the first business of the schools to reflect and reinforce. As Curti (1935) has shown, the Harris theory of education is accordingly traditionalistic in its cultural role. Change is not for an instant denied. But, as with the great majority of other essentialists and perennialists, the schools are charged with the first obligation to follow, not to modify or redirect, whatever course the institutions and practices of man as a member of society are destined to pursue.

As we have already seen, progressivists and reconstructionists are unwilling to settle for the Harris variety of policy and program. This is not to say that they conceive of education as *the* agency of cultural change—certainly not without careful safeguards to broaden the concept of education to embrace much more than formally organized learning and teaching. Their organismic psychology, however, plus their normative picture of democracy as a social laboratory engaged in continuous experimentation with every sort of human problem, enables them to argue that cultural change is not a mere epiphenomenon to which schools must passively adjust but is, in significant degree, a controllable process for human growth.

But operationalists in education could immensely benefit by further attention to some of the insights and discoveries of anthropology with regard to the meanings of process. For one thing, considerable evidence could be produced to show that progressivism, particularly, has underestimated or simply failed to cope squarely with the powerful resistances to consciously directed change that are typical of cultures. The frequent criticism leveled against Dewey, and even more his educational disciples, that they have inherited too generous a residue of faith in progress and rationality characteristic of the Enlightenment, may contain more than a grain of truth.

Thus, while it would be wholly inaccurate to assert that they have ignored the weaknesses of this traditional faith, progressivists do not appear to have given direct, careful attention to the importance of, for example, cultural patterns—to the kind of intensive investigations conducted by Kroeber (1944) and others to demonstrate the recurrence and persistence

of such patterns throughout history. Greater awareness of this phenomenon would compel educational theorists to take into consideration a hypothesis such as cultural curves of upswing and downswing, and so to assess far more realistically their own sometimes overconfident if not naïve belief in the novelty, flexibility, and continuity of organized human development.

It is even possible that greater appreciation of anthropological theory and research would force progressivists to take a new look at their favorite concept of "creative intelligence." While they have never accepted anything like the "great man theory of history," neither have they adequately scrutinized the limitations of individual capacity to effect change. The "child-centered school," although occasionally a distortion in practices of progressivism in theory, and although now partly overshadowed by the notion of "community-centered schools," is still held up to thousands of teachers in training as an educational ideal. It is an ideal, I suggest, which to some extent is governed by individualistic biases that are in fact incompatible with anthropological knowledge of cultural structures and persistences.

At the same time it should be pointed out that in one still narrow sector of educational theory and practice, the impact of concepts of cultural process is considerable. I refer to the movement called intercultural education, itself largely the effect of progressivist influences. Such familiar and rewarding operational concepts as acculturation, assimilation, diffusion, and innovation have begun to take hold and have even been put to limited experimental use in certain school programs. I do not find, however, that the concept of enculturation is as widely utilized: it symbolizes the crucial fact, still far from adequately stressed, that learning is culturally motivated, conditioned, and directed, and hence that we are unlikely to construct any kind of competent educational psychology except in close co-operation with cultural anthropology.

Contributions to the problem of cultural process have been so numerous that it is difficult to resist the temptation to explore their educational bearings a great deal further. Here I am able to select only two concepts of unusual provocation. The first, neglected thus far by education, is "cultural focus"—the tendency, if Herskovits (1948, pp. 542 ff.) is correct, for cultures to organize certain variable clusters of traits in terms of dominant interests (aesthetic, economic, social, or others) of which members are likely to be especially aware, and hence which are more pliable. Assuming that the focus of our own culture, for example, is technological, it does seem true that in this domain we are readier to examine methods and devices, to strive for improvement and innovation, than in more peripheral domains such as organized religion. Granting that the concept is debatable, it suggests to educators that if they are to play any sort of creative role in cultural process, one of their first duties must be to determine as clearly as possible the precise character of the focus or foci of given cultures and subcultures, and then to construct strategies of change geared to this character.

The second concept is derived not immediately from anthropology, which is apparently unaware of it, but from educational philosophy: it is the theory of "practical intelligence" developed by Bruce Raup (1950) and a group of associates in the progressivist camp. Utilizing numerous principles from anthropology as well as other social sciences, they have sought to sharpen the function of intelligence as an instrument of cultural change by dissecting several components which they contend are neglected by those who define it in typically scientific terms. Thus they find that practical intelligence consists of three "moods"—the indicative, optative, and imperative—expressing respectively the surveying, normative, and programmatic phases of the total function. The major methodology of action emerging from their analysis is expressed in the discipline of an "uncoerced community of persuasion." It is this discipline which they hope can be put into widespread educational and social operation, as a way both to reduce tensions between and within cultural groups and to accelerate change in directions found to be desirable in the course of testing that methodology. The potential reciprocity of the concepts of practical intelligence and cultural focus in educational change is probably rich. Beginnings are, indeed, discernible in the greater perceptiveness of some educational leaders to the structures of local communities where schools operate, and which they must learn to carry along in any developments they undertake.

Raup and his colleagues proceed from a crucial assumption that is by no means as carefully considered either by educational or anthropological theory as it ought to be—the assumption that the present period of history is beset by abnormal strain, confusion, and a pervading sense of crisis. I select the concept of crisis for a moment of special attention because it is here perhaps most revealingly that one may place the problem of cultural process in the setting of a possible metaculturology of knowledge. Returning for a moment to the four philosophies of education in order to explicate the point, it is at least a legitimate hypothesis that these philosophies may be viewed not merely as significant symbolizations but as alternative diagnoses and prognoses of the present crisis in political, moral, economic, and other forms of national and international relations.

In very general terms, the perennialist formula aims to change culture by reacting against what it considers to be the ailment of materialistic and experimental habits and beliefs. Therefore it favors the restoration of aristocratic and/or theocratic principles and practices prevailing at a much earlier time in Western history—the Greek and Medieval periods, especially. The essentialist formula, exemplified by Harris, tends to utilize the *sui generis* ontology of modern idealism or realism in order to cultivate adjustment to the moving stream of history. Progressivism, symbolized by such concepts as practical intelligence, is committed to a democratic methodology which encourages gradual but deliberately planned cultural change with secondary regard for commitment to future goals. The reconstructionist, finally, builds his case upon the premise that progressivism, however potent, is no longer wholly satisfactory to cope with the deep-seated

maladjustments of a crisis-age such as ours. Hence he contends that if the democratic values and institutions in which he believes are to survive, flourish, and expand, fresh and challenging designs for culture-and-education must now be constructed as well as implemented upon an audacious scale, with the fullest possible recognition of the obstacles and pressures which anthropology and other social sciences enable him to estimate.

It is only fair to admit that this metaculturological interpretation of American theories of education is by no means at present widely influential. Also, one ought to note that it is a way of organizing diffused masses of theory and practice that overlap in numerous ways, and therefore refuse in fact to be confined by such neat classifications. Nevertheless, if we remember that the attempt is entirely operational, this kind of approach may prove meaningful not only for the field of education but also for other fields.

It is interesting, for example, to examine the extent to which the concept of crisis in its peculiar relevance for the twentieth century is central to anthropological theory. Of course the concept is by no means ignored. Not only is it crucial to the work of such philosophers of culture as Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee, Lewis Mumford, and Ortega y Gassett, but one also finds it receiving occasional attention by Franz Boas (especially in his writings for the layman), and by other leaders in anthropology. At the same time, one is struck by the fact that *as an explicitly treated concept* it is conspicuously absent from the index and content of *Anthropology Today*, from the recent technical "review of concepts and definitions of culture" by Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952), from more than one widely read textbook in anthropology (e.g., Kroeber, 1948; Herskovits, 1948), and even from the invitingly titled symposium, *The Science of Man in the World Crisis* (Linton, ed., 1945).

I do not pretend to guess all the reasons for such striking omissions or peripheral treatments. Yet it would seem fair to inquire why a considerable section of anthropological theory finds the concept of crisis so uncongenial to its own systematic investigations. Surely, if it is held that we are now in the throes of world-wide cataclysm (the contention is itself debatable, of course), one would expect both its general meaning and bearing upon specific issues to receive sustained attention from anthropology. As is true of educational theory, I do not find this, by and large, to be the case. Perhaps even more than in educational theory, however, I fail to find careful attention paid to the question of why those theorists of culture who have explicitly dealt with the problem of crisis tend to react to it in alternative ways.

The issue here, in other words, is whether it is possible that anthropologists and allied scholars are themselves likely to vary both in their critiques and proposals according to their various locations on what might be called the continuum of a metaculturology of knowledge. To what degree if at all, for example, is Sorokin's anticipation of a new "ideational" culture motivated by his own metaculturological preferences rather than detached scientific judgments? Again, might further investigation show

that the approach of functionalism in anthropology reflects, more or less, the same sociopolitically liberal orientation toward cultural change as does the educational methodology of practical intelligence? Similarly, is the *sui generis* position (cf. White, 1949*b*, pp. 344–47) likely to reveal or at least inadvertently to bolster attitudes and actions somewhat analogous to the conservative predilections of most educational essentialists? Is it even possible, finally, that those anthropologists, like those educators, who largely disregard the concept of crisis do so partly, at any rate, because it remains outside the range of their own ideological orientation—their own personal and professional status in the culture of their time?

The answer to such questions is far from self-evident. A meeting, however, of anthropological and educational theory at this juncture might benefit both fields in their endeavor to articulate and cope with the concept of process from their more deep-seated and pervasive assumptions.

IV

The problem of cultural values (anticipated, of course, in the issue just raised) is, if anything, a still more hazardous venture. One reason is that philosophers who specialize in axiology are themselves profoundly at odds. Another reason is that anthropologists have not until recently paid much careful attention to values. Educational theory is affected by both of these reasons. Its own widely varying theories support an equally wide range of opposing views of the role of values, but attempts to relate these views to the live issues of teaching and learning in real cultures have frequently been sterile. Still, it is my impression that today both education and anthropology are increasingly eager to penetrate the whole sphere of values, for both are coming to realize that indifference toward the problem can be tolerated no longer.

In anthropological theory, one of the most promising approaches may prove to be the personality-and-culture movement. The contributions of such diverse experts in the psychological sciences as Geza Roheim, Abram Kardiner, Lawrence K. Frank, Harry Stack Sullivan, Gardner Murphy, and of anthropologists such as Margaret Mead, A. Irving Hallowell, John J. Honigmann (1954), and others earlier mentioned, have widened and deepened the concept of cultural values even when they have not always sought to single them out for sustained examination. The immediate explanation, no doubt, is that values for all of these scholars tend, on the one hand, to be grounded in the energies of human beings—in what are variously referred to as needs, wants, drives, interests, desires—and, on the other hand, to be molded by the environment of nature and culture. Thus despite disagreement and uncertainty at many points, the personality- and-culture movement serves to locate the problem where educational theory is, in turn, only starting to cope seriously with it—in scientifically ascertainable realms of discourse and investigation.

So far as I have been able to pursue the concept of values in contemporary anthropological sources, two statements have impressed me most. The first, by Kluckhohn (1952) with the help of others, is weakened

by repeated if possibly unavoidable terms like "somehow" and "in some senses" which often threaten to beg the precise points at issue. Nevertheless, the statement attempts painstakingly to formulate a theory of values based upon recent investigations both by philosophers and social scientists. I select only a few high lights.

Kluckhohn's key definition, in the context of a "general theory of action," is this: "A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which includes the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action" (p. 395). Proceeding from the postulate that "normative and existential propositions" are empirically interdependent although logically distinguishable, Kluckhohn analyzes this definition to mean, among other things, that (1) values are constructs involving both cognitive and cathectic factors; (2) they are always potentially but not always actually verbalized; (3) while primarily cultural products they are uniquely expressible by each individual and each group; (4) because particular desires may be either disvalued or valued, it is essential to make sure that values are equated rather with the desirable, defined according to the "requirements of both personality and sociocultural system for order, the need for respecting the interests of others and of the group as a whole in social living" (p. 399); (5) selection among available alternative values are attachable to both the means and ends of action. This general conception has unusual significance for educators unwilling to settle for the easy notion of education as transmission of values: it invites them to treat value determination and implementation as, at least partially, also a conscious, selective, and creative enterprise of man in culture.

In trying to classify values, Kluckhohn finds that they may be grouped into such dimensions as modality, content, intent, generality, intensity, explicitness, extent, and organization. Of all these dimensions, perhaps the most pertinent for educational theory is that of "extent," which grapples with the old but lively issue of the relativity versus universality of values. Kluckhohn appears dubious of the position, popularized by Benedict (1934) and others, and influential today in programs of intercultural education, that values are purely relative to the particular culture which supports them. While recognizing that the problem of universal values has not as yet been attacked at all adequately by social scientists, he nonetheless contends that some values—reciprocity, control of mere impulse, respect for human life, for example—are in general considered desirable by all known cultures. His review with Kroeber (1952, pp. 174 ff.) is careful to insist that neither universality nor relativity is a sufficient category: "Both perspectives are true and important, and no false either-or antinomy must be posed between them." Nevertheless, "the phrase 'a common humanity' is in no sense meaningless." Judgments about value can be "based both upon cross-cultural evidence as to the universalities in human needs, potentialities, and fulfillments and upon natural science knowledge with which the basic assumptions of any philosophy must be congruent."

The importance of this view of the dimension of "extent" is made clearer by the second statement, prepared by Bidney (1953*b*). While there is much here, too, that cannot be summarized, I call particular attention to his repudiation of extreme relativism. After tracing "the concept of value in modern anthropology" all the way from Rousseau and other philosophers of the Enlightenment down to the present day, Bidney develops his own position (p. 698):

> The choice is no longer between a romantic cultural pluralism and a fixed evolutionary absolutism but rather between a world in perpetual crisis and a world order based on rational principles capable of winning the adherence of the nations of the world. . . . So long as anthropology remains at the descriptive stage, which is the first stage of empirical science, anthropologists may rest content with cultural pluralism, on the ground that they do not wish to overstep the bounds of scientific fact. But if anthropology is to attain the stage of making significant generalizations . . . then comparative studies of cultures must be made with a view to demonstrating universal principles of cultural dynamics and concrete rational norms capable of universal realization.

With a few substitutions, these words might have been written by an educational reconstructionist. Borrowing much from progressivism as always, he too rejects absolutist theories of value held by essentialist-perennialist educators and widely indoctrinated today both by secular and parochial schools. He too, however, denies that relativism is the only possible alternative to these theories. With Bidney, the reconstructionist searches for a way to build empirical and hence temporal universals amidst the admitted relativity of values—universals emerging with the help of cross-cultural investigations such as those of G. P. Murdock (1945) that search for the "common denominator of cultures."

While reconstructionism is a decidedly unfinished theory, I should like to select four features of its emerging conception of values (cf. Brameld, 1947; 1950, pp. 473 ff.) where close co-operation with anthropological theory would conceivably benefit both sides. It should be emphasized, however, that these features are selected not to proselytize for a particular outlook but solely to illustrate further how the two disciplines of anthropology and education may converge around a common issue. Other theories than reconstructionism might have been chosen to make the same point.

One feature is the effort of reconstructionists to define values as, in essence, "want-satisfactions"—an effort reflecting the influence of, among others, W. I. Thomas, Ralph Barton Perry, and Bronislaw Malinowski. Here Kluckhohn's treatment of the role of the "desirable" and of "selection" would, I am sure, greatly refine the reconstructionist conception. Also, the negative answer of Dorothy Lee (1948) to her own question, "Are basic needs ultimate?" should contribute further to its refinement by calling attention to the cultural values that underlie needs and wants themselves. One might then argue (to paraphrase Veblen's amusing dictum, "Invention is the mother of necessity") that values are the mother of

needs. Perhaps a still more precise formulation, however, would recognize the polarity of the two terms. For, as Kluckhohn (1952, p. 428) observes, "the relationship between a value system and a need or goal system is necessarily complex. Values *both* rise from and create needs."

A second feature is the normative generalization, "social-self-realization"—a high-level abstraction for the most encompassing universal value. This term might meet Lee's objection that needs are given merely as a list. Suggesting a Gestalt of want-satisfactions in which both personal and group values interpenetrate, it epitomizes much of the same affirmative viewpoint to be found in the culturally oriented psychoanalyst, Erich Fromm (1947). The concept of social-self-realization is not at all, however, an attempt to smuggle in an absolutist axiology under new disguise. Abraham Edel (1953, p. 565), in speaking of the problem of categories as one of the areas where philosophy and anthropology could profitably cooperate, puts the issue in a way that is equally relevant to social-self-realization as an empirically grounded norm:

> Any such set of reference points, however well established, could not constitute a closed set defined once and for all; the elements would themselves change and grow with the growth of scientific knowledge. . . . Similarly, new "needs" may be added, as the need for emotional security has come to be recognized in our own time. The fundamental point in basing ethnographic categories [or normative generalizations] on universal elements would therefore seem to be their constant bearing to the best available *results* in the cooperative effort of the sciences of man. On the surface this seems to involve a paradox: the categories depend in part on the resultant pattern of knowledge, and the growth of knowledge depends in part on the types of categories employed. But the paradox is only on the surface; this type of non-vicious circle is a familiar characteristic of the method of science. The openness of the set ultimately therefore constitutes a practical but not a theoretical difficulty.

Third, reconstructionism emphasizes the role of "social consensus" in value formulation. Social-self-realization, for example, always involves tacit or open agreement among participants in a culture that here, indeed, is the guiding norm of their conduct. The necessity of such agreement as intrinsic to the process and product of valuation is insufficiently considered either by anthropology or by education. It is only mentioned in Kluckhohn's statement, for example; and although consensus as an explicit concept more frequently enters into the writings of Herskovits (1948, e.g., p. 575) than any other anthropologist I have thus far read, even he does not appear to have profited widely from the research of Kurt Lewin (1948) and other "field" theorists in the social sciences who are centrally or tangentially concerned with the import of that concept. Yet, any effort to establish a defensible conception of universal values is, I suggest, singularly in need of the consensus principle. If Bidney is right in his demand for values "capable of winning the adherence of the nations of the world," anthropology and education will have to concern themselves with how and to what degree such adherence can be attained. Implicit in the concept is also, of course, the necessity and privilege of dissent.

Fourth, reconstructionism asks whether the concept of "myth" may not carry unassessed significance for a mature theory of cultural values. Here philosophers like Cassirer as well as anthropologists could provide additional guidance. Not only might they point to the dangers and limitations of mythical values in past and present cultures. They might help also to clarify the issue of whether there is still not a legitimate place for affectively toned, poetically expressed, but rationally defensible dramatizations of twentieth-century culture—dramatizations that could serve to magnetize the humane goals now so urgently required to neutralize the spurious fascination of totalitarian mythologies.

Little further need be said here of the relevance of a metaculturology of knowledge for the problem of values. It is implicit throughout the discussion above. Yet, as in the case of cultural process, it is difficult to believe that either anthropological or educational theorists are frequently concerned with the questions of how far and in what ways ideological motivations, for example, may be operating surreptitiously upon their own value judgments and commitments. One of Bidney's (1953*b*, pp. 688 f.) too rare comments on this crucial point illustrates the kind of needed interpretation to which I refer. Speaking of Benedict, Boas, and cultural relativists in general, he says:

> In retrospect, it appears that American anthropologists continued to reflect the prevailing attitude of their democratic society. As liberals and democrats, they merely accentuated tendencies inherent in their culture but professed to have derived their "higher tolerance" from a comparative study of primitive cultures. They uncritically assumed the value of cultural differences and their mutual compatibility. . . . Had they thought in terms of the possible incompatibility and conflict of ideologies . . . they would not have labored under the naïve optimism of cultural laissez-faire. It has taken the impact of the second World War to shake this romantic cultural optimism and to awaken anthropologists to the reality of cultural crises and to the need for cultural integration on a world scale.

Cultural relativism, no less than cultural absolutism or any other theory of values held by educators and anthropologists, is itself conditioned by the cultural matrix of patterns and forces within which it is expressed, rejected, or espoused.

V

For the concluding problem, I have chosen cultural integration, referred to by Bidney above, mainly because it serves to tie together numerous strands earlier considered.

Although "integration" is itself a term of diverse meanings, the focal problem it generates is evident enough. On what demonstrable grounds, if any, can we hope to fashion a theory and program of education-and-culture that will organize, unify, harmonize the bewildering multiplicities of knowledge, values, practices, and beliefs that characterize an age of overspecialization, cross-purposes, and strife?

The concern of educators with this question is illustrated today by the

current debate over "general education." There is widespread agreement that something must be done about the chaos of departments, techniques, courses, and standards that clutter both the lower and higher levels of the schools. Yet when one scans the specific proposals for curing the evils that flow from this chronic eclecticism and confusion, one is struck by equally widespread disagreement as to what kind of general education is most desirable. Perennialists advocate classical curricula based largely on "great books," a faculty psychology, and a more or less freely admitted metaphysics derived from Aristotle. Essentialists, as represented to a considerable extent by the Harvard Report on *General Education in a Free Society*, rearrange traditional classifications and tone them up with a few cautious concessions to recent trends in curricula and techniques. Progressivists and reconstructionists advocate various forms of the "core curriculum" which reflects the Gestalt influence: central concern is with clusters of problems regarded as vital to young people living in a period of rapid transition. None of these positions, however, seems to have inquired at all thoroughly into what anthropological theory might offer by way of fresh criteria, and this despite the fact that many would not deny that cultural experience should provide some or all of those criteria.

It is helpful, I believe, to consider the problem in two main dimensions—integration as spatial order and as temporal order—each of which is, of course, polar to the other. By spatial order, I mean the holistic relations of cultures and subcultures viewed in horizontal and vertical cross-sections. By temporal order, I mean those same relations viewed as historical and sequential continuities and discontinuities.

Of several possible concepts, two—"pattern" and "social class"—may be chosen to illustrate the spatial dimension of culture. Kroeber's (1952, pp. 92 f.) definition of patterns is authoritative: they are "nexuses of culture traits which have assumed a definite and coherent structure, which function successfully, and which acquire major historic weight and persistence." They may either cut across cultures, as in the case of "Hebraic-Christian-Mohammedan monotheism" and "plow agriculture"; or, as in Benedict's models, they may coincide with indigenous, whole cultures (pp. 90–92). The other term, social class, refers to status levels as developed most conspicuously by W. L. Warner (1941)—a social class being defined in major part as "the largest group of people whose members have intimate access to one another. . . . Class is present in a community when people are placed by the values of the group itself at general levels of inferiority and superiority. . . ." (Cf. Mayer 1953, 1955; Warner, Havighurst, Loeb, 1944, p. 19.)

Although educational theory has undoubtedly been influenced more by the second of these two concepts, one may doubt whether either pattern or social class has been considered seriously by educators to exemplify a fresh and productive approach to the problem of integration itself. Yet the need for this approach must surely seem axiomatic to any anthropologist: an ordered general education must first of all incorporate, cope with, and evaluate the orders discernible in cultures. Thus these two concepts, combined of course with others, could help to crystallize new curricular designs dependent, first of all, upon the observable relations of real people living in real cultures—designs cutting both horizontally through groups and national boundaries (cf. Mead, 1953), and vertically through layers such as status, class, and caste (cf. Davis, Gardner, 1941).

The polar dimension, temporal order, points to the dynamic factor of integration. It is a factor that demands recognition of the endless flow of cultural events through the past, into the present, and toward the future. Most anthropologists today reject any semblance of inherent progress in this flow, as indeed they have rejected the earlier "evolutionary" theory of culture. Few if any, however, have ever denied the indispensable value of history. The understandable reaction of Boas and his school against the speculative character of "evolutionary" anthropology is now being qualified in the direction of more balanced views, such as those of the English archaeologist, V. Gordon Childe (1951) and the historical theories of Kroeber (cf. 1952, pp. 118 ff.). The latter has, indeed, gone so far as to cite approvingly the opinion of Eduard Meyer that anthropology, being "the study of the general . . . forms of human life and development," is a more proper term for that study than the philosophy of history (p. 76). Kroeberian contributions of great value include the effort to synchronize history and science on a "sliding-scale," as opposed to the traditional dichotomy of the two disciplines, and the hypothesis that one may profitably concentrate upon "cross-sectional moments" of history in such a way as to subordinate time for purposes of characterizing the forms and patterns of a given period of culture.

Both education and anthropology itself could, nevertheless, benefit from the possibilities of enriching the concept of integration afforded by recent philosophies of history. Some attention, to be sure, has been paid to Spengler and others mentioned above. Also, it is interesting to note that Kroeber, in holding that history is properly interpretative and reconstructive, expresses much the same general view as the English philosopher of history, R. G. Collingwood (1946). On the whole, however, interdisciplinary explorations of this sort remain in the future. In terms of general education, the need for such explorations to revitalize the function of history in high-school and college curricula is acute indeed. The sterile courses now littering typical programs should be discarded in favor of creative, comparative interpretations of the great movements and struggles of cultures through time—interpretations that utilize Kroeber's (1944) "configurations of culture growth," Northrop's (1946) "undifferentiated esthetic continuum" of Oriental cultures, Mumford's (1941) pendulum of "renewal," Toynbee's (1939) "challenge-and-response," and many other galvanizing and synthesizing concepts that would invigorate and stretch the youthful mind.

One final concept from anthropology—"configuration"—highlights the dialectical character of spatial and temporal order. While the term is often used synonymously with "pattern," it more often tends now to connote culture as a "way of life" or, as Sapir (1949, pp. 548 ff.) puts it,

"deep-seated culture patterns" that "are not so much known as felt, not so much capable of conscious description as naïve practice . . ." A configuration is the implicit aesthetic design, the theme, of a culture. Clearly, also, it relates to "value-orientations" discussed in Kluckhohn's (1952, p. 411) statement on values mentioned earlier; there they are defined as "a generalized and organized conception, influencing behavior, of nature, of man's place in it, of man's relations to man, and of the desirable and non-desirable as they relate to man-environment and interhuman relations."

Configurations then embrace and deepen, on the one hand, both the horizontal and vertical interrelations of culture, and, on the other hand, their historical interrelations. They apply more or less aptly either to a fairly homogeneous subculture, such as the Navaho Indian, or to heterogeneous culture, such as the Japanese. That configurations are one of the chief reasons both for the stubbornness and ubiquity of ethnocentricism is fairly obvious. With all their subtleties and complexities, however, they offer tremendous challenge to the concept of integration in educational theory. For one thing, they enable us to perceive that cultural reality, process, and value are all encompassed by that concept. For another, they suggest a possible fusion of the traditionally honorific notion of culture, laden as it is with the values of the "cultivated" carrier, and the scientific conception of culture as the inclusive view of the environment fashioned by man. For still another, they complement the concept of myth as a cautious aid in envisaging the needed goals of modern life.

But perhaps the most exciting of all implications in the concept of configuration is the likelihood that it can eventually assist anthropologists and educators in the formulation of an operationally incisive metaculturology of knowledge. The insistence of Sapir upon the unconscious or covert meanings inherent in culture as a way of life calls our attention in a different way to the elusive assumptions that govern all attempts to express those meanings. In our time, the problem of adequate expression is especially difficult. All of us are likely to be caught in the whirlpools of fear and uncertainty generated, in turn, by the speed of acculturation and the threat of totalitarian power, of moral disintegration, and of planetary war. But few of us are sufficiently aware of the grim contradictions between those explicit credos endorsed by governments and schools, and those implicit values and similar beliefs expressed in overt conduct (cf. Myrdal, 1944).

The question still remains, of course, (*a*) whether education is able to do anything fundamental about such contradictions, and (*b*) if it is able, whether it should. The first part of this question was anticipated in discussing the reality of culture. If one tends to hold a *sui generis* view of culture, then one is likely also to hold that education can accomplish little except to conform with and endorse already given cultural configurations. If, however, one holds an operational view, then it is entirely plausible to contend that education can play a constructive part in enunciating and acting upon the problems generated by those configurations.

The second part of the question brings us back to the statement by

Sapir with which our discussion of configurations began. After delineating the meaning of "the unconscious patterning of behavior" in culture, he concludes with the following passage:

> No matter where we turn in the field of social behavior, men and women do what they do, and cannot help but do, not merely because they are built thus and so, or possess such and such differences of personality . . . but very largely because they have found it easiest and aesthetically most satisfactory to pattern their conduct in accordance with more or less clearly organized forms of behavior. . . . It is sometimes necessary to become conscious of the forms of social behavior in order to bring about a more serviceable adaptation to changed conditions, but I believe it can be laid down as a principle of far-reaching application that in the normal business of life it is useless and even mischievous for the individual to carry the conscious analysis of his cultural patterns around with him. That should be left to the student whose business it is to understand these patterns. A healthy unconsciousness of the forms of socialized behavior to which we are subject, is as necessary to society as is the mind's ignorance, or better, unawareness, of the workings of the viscera to the health of the body. . . . We must learn to take joy in the larger freedom of loyalty to thousands of subtle patterns of behavior that we can never hope to understand in explicit terms . . . [pp. 588 f.].

Now this is a disturbing argument, certainly, to anyone who takes a transformative view of culture and of education as an instrument of culture. It can be construed as an invitation to relegate efforts to examine and express the premises of any culture solely to experts. It can be construed as an invitation, also, to leave the rest of us blissfully ignorant of what our culture most deeply means, and hence insensitive to its disparities, its lags, its obsolescences. If Sapir were merely to mean that we cannot and should not always, at every moment, be conscious of cultural configurations he would, of course, be right. Cultural like individual experience is, in Dewey's terms, immediate as well as mediate or reflective. But it is clear that Sapir does not mean this merely. Rather, he implies a dualistic thesis: on the one side, there are the few who are alone apparently competent to delve into the mysterious depths of unconscious culture and on the other side, the many who are incompetent.

Such a position, the motivations of which might themselves benefit by exposure to a metaculturology of knowledge, is untenable in a democratic culture—or even in one that might become democratic. However, gigantic the task, however frequent the failures, a culture of this kind is one that must be undertsood, genuinely understood, by the largest possible proportion of those who carry its burdens, who hold ultimate responsibility for its failures and achievements, its means and ends. Hence utmost consciousness of configurational order is likewise their responsibility.

There are, I suggest, at least five norms by which education must be guided if it is to be seriously concerned with that kind of order. The first is for the schools of each culture to formulate as clearly and explicitly as they are able their present implicit premises—premises which are, of course, more or less precisely those of their respective cultures. The second is to consider wherein their resultant formulations appear outworn,

inconsistent, or otherwise wanting in view of the transformations now occurring in the economic, religious, and other spheres of life. The third is to experiment with restatements that more honestly enunciate their actual as against traditionally professed configurations, and of course to implement these restatements through integrated policies and programs. The fourth is to provide for comparative studies of the results, by as many informal as well as formal educational agencies of as many cultures as possible. The final aim is to achieve not only a whole array of educational formulations that have profited by critical interaction, but also a unified international formulation that accepts common principles, common objectives, and common tasks for education everywhere on earth.

These five norms, difficult and gigantic though they are, may not be as idealistic as at first they seem. Actually, sporadic and fumbling efforts along similar lines are already under way, both in the schools of various countries and in commissions of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. One trouble with many of these efforts has been, not that they are not well-intentioned or motivated by cultural disturbances, but that they have often been superficial because unwilling or unable to penetrate to the covert level where the real problem of configuration lies. Moreover, partly because of a dearth of close co-operation between educators, on the one side, and anthropologists, on the other, there has been a failure to perceive that any successful effort to reformulate a unified conception of education for our age must incorporate what we may now call three dimensions of cultural order. These are: the horizontal-vertical dimension of culture in space, the historical dimension of culture in time, and the "qualitative" dimension of configuration which compounds the first two into an integrated whole—an aesthetic design for a modern philosophy of education-and-culture.

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