I hold the view that we should regard as "political" every systematic effort, performed at any place in the social field, to move other men in pursuit of some design cherished by the mover. According to this view we all have the required material: any one of us has acted with others, been moved by others, and has sought to move others. (p. 38-39)

Many intellectual delusions dissolve if one cleaves to the simple truth that we begin our lives as infants. Man is not born free but dependent. He does not renounce rights when entering into society but he owes his very existence and the features of his developed being to the fostering group. Instead of homo sapiens we should speak of homo docilis, who reaches a condition of more or less sapient manhood thanks to his unfolding within a primary social nest. Our claims to knowledge rests upon our ability to learn, far the greater part of which is a receptivity to teaching. (p. 60-61)

When we think of an established Authority, the very notion implies our thinking of three categories of people: subjects to whom commands are addressed, agents who carry out commands, choosers who decide the contents of the commands. (p. 171-2).

In a "State" as distinct from a "People" ..., decision of Authority imply instructions to act which are addressed immediately to agents of Authority rather than the people at large. (p. 188)

The character of a State changes with the agencies and procedures whereby what has been said gets done. (p. 191)

In this chapter, as is typical throughout, de Jouvenel emphasizes the doing of politics and thereby the uncertainty of all involved, including those with Authority: there cannot be absolute assured power because, as de Jouvenel says elsewhere (p. 219) , human beings "possess energy" . This, of course is the same argument as Bateson (1960) on the difference between stones and dogs on being quicked.